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ABSTRACT 
As technology drives society to a ubiquitously wireless world, the paradox of mobile 
wireless network accessibility versus resilience is disturbingly trending in opposite 
directions. The demand for cellular networks with greater capacity and bandwidth 
appears to be the primary factor in expanding coverage nationwide, with resilience 
becoming a secondary thought. It is expected that resilient systems will be able to 
withstand shocks and stresses from critical incidents and still be able to function as 
intentionally designed. However, the fragility of cellular networks affected by recent 
disasters within the last ten years has demonstrated otherwise.  
The purpose of this research is to direct attention to the importance of cellular 
base station functionality during power outages and illustrate how these assets require 
modification to provide critical communications for the public to summon aid, and first 
responders to coordinate response efforts. Prior research offers strategies to implement 
post-disaster remediation supplanting failed localized communication infrastructure. This 
mitigating strategy requires substantial time, labor, and planning to deploy that 
subsequently detracts from conducting immediate response and recovery. This research is 
intended to propose a path forward for resiliency in U.S. mobile cellular networks using 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Modern telecommunication systems are expected by the public to provide reliable 
service—most importantly during critical situations allowing the public to summon help 
while first responders simultaneously coordinate rescue and recovery efforts. Given 
recent telecom failures seen throughout the U.S. within the last ten years attributed to 
natural disasters, a problematic paradox appears to present itself. There are various causes 
for system failure, but the most prominent is the loss of commercial grid power. 
However, apparent this may be, there still exists a lack of collaboration between 
government and private telecom entities to remedy this issue.  
Considering the global proliferation and dependence of mobile devices and 
applications, along with the parallel demand for wireless infrastructure these devices 
operate over, it is startling that cellular phone carriers are not required nor are proactively 
installing backup power to cell tower base stations. Base stations provide wireless access 
for mobile phones and devices to the wired telephone network. Without base stations 
(BSs) being operational, the public and private sector that are dependent on cellular 
devices become incapable of transmitting voice or data; hence, communications blackout 
for those without access to landline phones.  
The importance of BS functionality during power outages becomes a critical issue 
the National Public Safety Broadband Network will need to consider. This public safety 
network is proposed to provide interoperable communications between first responder 
through out the country and would rely heavily on some aspect of commercial BSs. In 
order to expand on this premise, the telecommunications infrastructure supporting mobile 
cellular access has been analyzed within this research, with an emphasis placed on base 
stations also referred to as cell sites. Changes are required to the commercial cellular 
network in order to provide the National Public Safety Broadband Network mission 
critical capacity for first responders during emergency incidents. 
India’s National Telecommunications Policy for 2012 offers potential solutions to 
provide BS autonomy from grid power through alternative energy, such as: fuel cells and 
 xiii 
renewable photovoltaic (PV), wind energy, reducing fossil fuel dependency while 
lowering harmful carbon emissions. This strategy provides prospective implications 
throughout the globe with conceivable application for the U.S., as noted in Scientific 
America, January 2013, “Even in developed nations with reliable electricity, changes in 
the structure of mobile networks could open the door for alternative energy.”1 
 
 
1  Katherine Tweed, “Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar 
Power,” Scientific American (January 15, 2013). 
 xiv 
                                                 
I. DEVELOPING A RESILIENT “GREEN” CELLULAR 
NETWORK  
A. INTRODUCTION 
An examination of the commercial wireless industry reveals a strategy of vast 
reaching national coverage, in anticipation of the trajectory of mobile cellular demand. 
CTIA The Wireless Association, an international nonprofit trade association representing 
major wireless carriers, reports there were approximately 213,299 cell sites nationwide in 
the U.S. as of December 2007. That figure five years later had risen to 301,779, an 
astonishing 41 percent increase.1 The global economy has developed an insatiable need 
for wireless infrastructure in order to support the massive growth of mobile commerce 
(m-commerce) generated via mobile devices, with retail sales projected to reach $86.86 
billion in the U.S. by 2016.2  Reflecting this reality, Presidential Memorandum dated 
June 2010 states, “the world is going wireless, and we must not fall behind.”3 The 
demand for mobile cellular access has prompted many households in the U.S. to forego 
wired phone connectivity. One in three households (34 percent) in the U.S. have 
transitioned to cell phones as their primary telephone service, opting out of conventional 
landline service as reported by the National Center for Health Statistic, June 2012.4   
Many consumers have grown accustomed, though, to the reliability of copper 
landlines during power outages. An article produced by Consumer Reports, January 2012 
titled, “Surprise! Your High-Tech Home Phone System Could Go Dead in An 
Emergency” explains how unlike fiber, copper bears inherent properties capable of 
withstanding local power outages for at least a certain period of time. “The benefit of the 
1  “Wireless Quick Facts,” http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/research/index.cfm/AID/10323, Comparison 
taken from December 2007 to December 2012. 
2  “eMarketer: Tablets, Smartphones Drives Mobile Commerce to Record Heights.” 
www.eMarketer.com. 
3  President Barack Obama, “Presidential Memorandum: Unleashing the Wireless Broadband 
Revolution,” The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/presidential-memorandum-unleashing-wireless-broadband-revolution. 
4  Stephen J. Blumberg, Julian V. Luke, Nadarajasundaram Ganesh, Michael E. Davern, and Michel H. 
Boudreaux, National Health Statistics Reports Number 61, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, October 12, 2012. 
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old copper service is that, unlike fiber…it carries not only the voice and data signals but 
also the power to operate a standard, noncordless telephone.”5 Phone companies are 
hoping to decommission landlines for an all-digital network, providing high-speed 
connectivity— but with a critical dependency on commercial grid power. Both AT&T 
and Verizon, the largest U.S. telecom service providers have requested approval from the 
federal government to proceed with upgrading their telecom network infrastructure to 
support phone service with Internet-technology traversing over airwaves and fiber. 6  
Many consumers, however, do not realize the intrinsic weakness of this proposal as noted 
in Verizon’s “Terms of Service for FiOS Digital Voice”, which states, “The Service 
(including 911 dialing) will not function during a power outage without a back-up power 
source.”7  
Modern telecommunication systems are expected by the public to provide reliable 
service—most importantly during critical situations allowing the public to summon help 
while first responders simultaneously coordinate rescue and recovery efforts. Given 
recent telecom failures seen throughout the U.S. within the last ten years attributed to 
natural disasters, a problematic paradox appears to present itself. There are various causes 
for system failure, but the most prominent is the loss of commercial grid power. 
However, apparent this may be, there still exists a lack of collaboration between 
government and private telecom entities to remedy this issue. There are a host of reasons 
that prevent productive dialogue. The most prevalent appears to gravitate around the cost 
associated in upgrading this wireless infrastructure.  
Considering the global proliferation and dependence of mobile devices and 
applications, along with the parallel demand for wireless infrastructure these devices 
operate over, it is startling that cellular phone carriers are not required nor are proactively 
5  “Surprise! Your High-Tech Home Phone System Could Go Dead in an Emergency,” 
ConsumerReports.org, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/2012/01/surprise-your-high-tech-home-phone-
system-could-go-dead-in-an-emergency/index.htm. 
6  Scott Moritz and Todd Shields, “Fire Island Becomes Test Case as Verizon Abandons Copper,” 
Bloomberg, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201300-700-8/fire-island-becomes-a-test-case-as-verizon-
abandons-copper-tech.html. 
7  “Verizon FiOS Digital Voice Terms of Service; Section 2 B,” 
http://www36.verizon.com/fiosvoice/terms/Terms_of_Service.pdf. 
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installing backup power to cell tower base stations. Base stations (BS) provide wireless 
access for mobile phones and devices to the wired telephone network. Without BSs being 
operational, the public and private sector that are dependent on cellular devices become 
incapable of transmitting voice or data; hence communications blackout for those without 
access to landline phones.  
BSs are predominantly mounted on fixed structures high above the landscape, 
allowing the broadcasting of radio frequency (RF) to travel for several miles. Most BSs 
rely on commercial grid power to operate. When power is lost, they cease to function, 
unless equipped with some form of backup power, which can be provided by various 
sources—the most common being battery banks. Considering the strategic direction of 
the two largest telecom providers in the U.S. migrating to an all digital network operating 
of BSs and fiber, it can logically be inferred that BSs should be resilient, capable of 
withstanding shocks and stresses from critical incidents while still being able to function 
as intentionally designed.8  However, the fragility of cellular networks affected by the 
litany of major disasters, have demonstrated otherwise.  
There has been much debate over the U.S. commercial cellular network and the 
lack of resilience and how that adversely affects first responders and the public during 
natural and man-made disasters.9  The fragility of this cellular infrastructure requires 
modification, as the National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN) has received 
legislative approval. The NPSBN is proposed to provide interoperable communications 
between first responders throughout the country through a singular standardized system. 
It is anticipated to leverage a great capacity of commercial cellular BSs. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted inquiries into keeping this network 
functioning during major calamities and natural disasters.10  A failure to address the 
intrinsic weakness of the US commercial cellular network exponentially increases the 
8  Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn Lazard, Co-Chairs. NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure, 2013. 
9  L. K. Moore, The First Responder’s Network and Next-Generation Communications for Public 
Safety: Issues for Congress, CRS Report 42543 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Research Service, 
March 5, 2013). 
10 “Surprise! Your High-Tech Home Phone System Could Go Dead in an Emergency.”  
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risk of first responders and the US populace being able to communicate during power 
outages. The NPSBN is currently in a conceptual stage with requirements codified in the 
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012. The First Responder Network 
Authority (FirstNet) will bear the immense responsibility of overseeing the development 
of the NPSBN over the next ten years. 
Achieving a robust and resilient cellular network requires a long-term investment 
and strategy that limits the effects of outages caused by the loss of grid power. The U.S. 
can look to nations that encounter frequent power outages for potential solutions to off set 
such dependency. India, the second largest mobile phone market globally recognized the 
potential value of mobile commerce and proactively strategized investing in the 
expansion and reliability of their cellular network, as noted in their National Telecom 
Policy-2012 (NTP).11  The policy posits how India can achieve its economic potential 
while providing socio-economic parity to its under serviced rural areas through a self-
sustainable “Green” cellular network capable of operating without grid power. This 
demographic represents the majority population and plays a substantial role in 
stimulating future commerce. The strategy addresses a key impediment throughout the 
country—an unreliable and underdeveloped commercial power grid. The core premise 
within the NTP is to transition the nation away from a diesel dependent cellular network 
and to one that employs environmentally friendly and sustainable renewable/alternative 
energy.  
Various studies have emerged offering potential solutions to provide BS 
autonomy from grid power through alternative energy, such as: fuel cells and renewable 
photovoltaic (PV), wind energy, reducing fossil fuel dependency while lowering harmful 
carbon emissions. This strategy provides prospective implications throughout the globe 
with conceivable application for the U.S., as noted by Katherine Tweed, “Even in 
developed nations with reliable electricity, changes in the structure of mobile networks 
could open the door for alternative energy.”12 
11  India’s National Telecom Policy - 2012 Government of India, Ministry of Communications & IT, 
Department of Telecommunications, June 2012. 
12  Tweed, “Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power.”   
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In order to expand on this premise, the telecommunications infrastructure 
supporting mobile cellular access has been analyzed within this research, with an 
emphasis placed on base stations also referred to as cell sites or cell towers.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The growth of smart phones, tablets, PCs, mobile Wi-Fi cards, and e-readers has 
increased the demand on mobile cellular networks. Sales of smart phones in 2012 are 
listed at 712.6 million, translating to an increase of 44.1 percent from 2011, reported by 
the International Data Corporation.13   As these devices grow in usage, so does the 
consumption of finite bandwidth—resulting in a technological shift to compensate and 
optimize to meet this exponential demand. In doing so, the telecom wireless industry 
travels down a path that Per Bak describes as Self Organized Criticality (SOC), which    
“increases because of incremental, but continuous, optimizations and other expediencies 
designed to improve daily life.” 14   These wireless networks, at stretched capacity, 
develop vulnerabilities from a lack of diversity, making them brittle, and inevitably at 
higher risk of catastrophic failures.15   
As technology drives society to a ubiquitously wireless world, the paradox of 
mobile wireless network accessibility vs. resilience is disturbingly trending in opposite 
directions. The demand for cellular networks with greater capacity and bandwidth 
appears to be the primary factor in expanding coverage nationwide, while resilience often 
becomes a secondary thought. Gerry Smith illustrates to what lengths carriers will go to 
avoid equipping BSs with appropriate backup capacity, “Mobile telephone companies 
have for years lobbied to kill rules that would have forced them to maintain backup 
power at their cell phone towers.”16   
13  “Strong Demand for Smartphones and Heated Vendor Competition Characterize the Worldwide 
Mobile Phone Market at the End of 2012,” press release, IDC, 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=prUS23916413#.UQ2_S47R3dk. 
14  T. G. Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World (Williams, CA: AGILE Press, 
2011). 
15  Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
16  Gerry Smith, “Wireless Industry Resisted Calls to Back Up Cell Towers before Sandy,” Huffington 
Post, sec. Tech, Nov 4, 2012. 
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It is expected that resilient systems will be able to withstand shocks and stresses 
from critical incidents and still be able to function as intentionally designed.17  However, 
the fragility of cellular networks affected by recent disasters within the last ten years, 
have demonstrated otherwise. For instance, Superstorm Sandy affected wireless phone 
access by knocking 25 percent of the Northeast’s cell towers off-line, with the primary 
cause associated to power failure.18  Such singular dependency on power conversely 
supports resilience.  
Exacerbating this issue are states considering legislation supporting the major 
telecoms strategic direction of decommissioning legacy landline phone service, replacing 
them with an all-digital wireless network comprised of cellular base stations—presumed 
to offer greater capacity and functionality, but inherently not as resilient during power 
outages compared to their landline counterpart.19  AT&T is planning to have all its 
landline phone service turned off by 2020, with Verizon pursuing similar policies.20  This 
fundamental change in policy is affecting “universal service,” an agreement constructed 
between the telephone industry and the government ensuring every family in the U.S. 
phone service.21  Florida, North Carolina, Texas, and Wisconsin have already repealed 
universal landline requirements.22  Several other states such as Ohio, Indiana, Alabama, 
Georgia, Mississippi and California are pursuing the same course of action to eliminate 
the requirement for service providers, such as Verizon and AT&T to maintain these  
legacy copper landlines.23  The changes will affect everyone across the country; however, 
17  Judith Rodin Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
18  Sinead Carew, “Hurricane Sandy Disrupts Northeast U.S. Telecom Networks,” Reuters, 
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE89T0YU20121030?irpc=932. 
19  Cecilia Kang, “Landline Rules Frustrate Telecoms,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2012. 
20  Associated Press, “Copper Telephone Lines Fade Away, Worrying Regulators and Consumers.” 
The Oregonian, July 8, 2013. 
http://www.oregonlive.com/business/index.ssf/2013/07/copper_telephones_lines_fade_a.html. 
21  National Telecommunications & Information Administration, “Universal Service,” 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/opadhome/opad_us.html. 
22  Kang, Landline Rules Frustrate Telecoms, 1. 
23  Kang, Landline Rules Frustrate Telecoms, 1. 
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the elderly and those living in distant rural areas that have poor coverage may be at 
greater risk.24 
The relevance of this issue was evident in such catastrophes as Hurricane Katrina 
(2005), the Derecho (2012) and Superstorm Sandy (2012). Many were unable to 
communicate with others or more importantly, summon help, as a result of cell tower 
base stations going off-line, while those with conventional landlines had some form of 
functionality.25 Carriers are not proactively equipping base stations with adequate backup 
power or utilizing alternative/renewable energy technology such as photovoltaic or wind 
power to allow them to operate independently of the power grid.26   
First responders throughout the country have long endured the difficulty of 
handling complex large-scale incidents requiring the response and collaboration of 
various agencies, and jurisdictions. During the late 1990s, the Public Safety Wireless 
Advisory Committee reviewed such grievances and outlined recommendations to 
facilitate better communications capacity among disparate responding emergency 
workers. 27  The report outlined the critical requirements needed to establish an 
Interoperable Public Safety Network, ultimately capable of providing communications 
synergy. This would later serve as the foundation for the NPSBN, which recently 
received legislative approval over a decade later under the Middle Class Tax Relief and 
Job Creation Act of 2012.28   
The NPSBN is proposed to operate over or leverage some capacity of commercial 
base stations equipped with next generation cellular technology known as 4G-LTE29 
24 “Copper Telephone Lines Fade Away, Worrying Regulators and Consumers.”  
25  Anton Troianovski, “Corporate News: Outages Highlight Worries on Phone Networks,” Wall 
Street Journal: Nov 5, 2012. 
26  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
27 Final Report of the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee to the Federal Communications 
Commission and The National Telecommunications & Information Administration, September 11, 1996. 
28  Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, Public Law 11299-6, (February 22, 2012): 
126 Stat., 156. 
29  “Long Term Evolution (LTE) Public Safety Information Sheet,” FCC, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/docs/LTE_Info_Sheet_09082010.pdf.  
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either as primary or redundant failover.30 The FCC Long Term Evolution (LTE) Public 
Safety Information Sheet explains how this next generation cellular technology works. 
“4G is based upon an all Internet Protocol (IP) packet switched network that supports 
mobile broadband access, as well as multi-media applications with high data rates and 
low latencies utilizing spectrum efficiency by smooth handoffs and seamless roaming 
across multiple networks.”31  This raises concern, as the commercial wireless network 
has not been mandated to equip their BSs with backup power. Understanding this critical 
deficiency and reliance of leveraging commercial wireless infrastructure, the NPSBN 
runs the risk of failing to provide mission critical operability for first responders when the 
loss of grid power occurs.  
In order to remedy some of these deficiencies with BSs in the U.S., an analysis of 
a comparable cellular network, which encounters frequent power outages, may provide 
insight for resiliency. India’s enormous mobile phone market, the second largest globally, 
is supported by approximately 400,000 BSs spread throughout the country.32  Keeping 
these cell towers functioning is a daunting task for telecoms with the government playing 
a central role. Many areas in India are supported by an under developed/inadequate 
power grid, which goes off line frequently. Cities are left in the dark at times up to 
fourteen hours.33  When power is lost, BSs require some form of back-up power in order 
to continue functioning. As such, telecoms have relied substantially on diesel generators 
to provide this continuity of service. Government involvement stems from subsidizing 
diesel throughout the country, which has become an economic burden as India lacks 
adequate domestic oil production, reliant on foreign imports.34   
In order to transition away from a diesel dependent cellular network, the 
government drafted environmentally sustainable standards outlined in the NTP-2012. The 
NTP posits the framework for India to achieve a dominant technological and economic 
30  Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 126 stat. 15611-26 Stat., 256. 
31 “Long Term Evolution (LTE) Public Safety Information Sheet.”  
32  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
33  Naikodi, “Solar-Wind Hybrid Power for Rural Indian Cell Sites,” 2010. 
34  “The World Factbook,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html. 
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role globally through the expansion of its mobile cellular network. The policy strategizes 
achieving these goals by tapping into the majority of the population residing in these rural 
areas with cellular technology. As such, significant changes are sought to mitigate the 
effects of power outages. In order to provide uninterrupted services during power 
outages, the NTP proposed using renewable/alternative energy. Telecoms in India have 
proactively begun this transformation with Mumbai rebranded as a “Green City.”35  The 
changes reflected in the NTP offer obvious potential for countries that have inadequate 
power grids. However, there is potential application in developed nations, where 
renewable/alternative energy can provide much-needed resilience to fragile cellular 
networks that lack appropriate back-up power for continuous service. There is also the 
added benefit of lowering carbon emissions by eliminating the predominant mechanism 
for back-up power, diesel generators.  
The purpose of this research is to direct attention to the importance of cellular 
base station (BS) functionality during power outages and illustrate how these assets 
require modification to provide critical communications for the public to summon aid, 
and first responders to coordinate response and recovery efforts. Prior research offers 
strategies to implement post-disaster remediation supplanting failed localized 
communication infrastructure. This mitigating strategy requires substantial time, labor, 
and planning to deploy, which subsequently detract from conducting immediate response 
and recovery during the onset of the emergency.36  This research is intended to highlight 
and propose a path forward for resiliency in mobile cellular communications 
infrastructure using renewable/alternative energy—minimizing the need to implement 
these timely stopgap measures.  
 
 
35  “Indus Towers’ Sites Turn Green in Mumbai,” LightReading India, News Wire Feed, 
http://www.lightreading.in/lightreadingindia/news-wire-feed/154821/indus-towers-sites-green-mumbai. 
36 See WWW.FEMA.Gov, “Mobile Emergency Response Support-Support Considerations.” 
 9 
                                                 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Are there common reasons for cellular base stations failure? 
2. Can the strategic direction taken by the Indian government to increase 
resilience within the country’s mobile cellular network utilizing renewable energy be 
considered a viable policy option for the United States to pursue? 
• Would implementing such a policy allow base stations to provide 
continuous service during power failures?  
• Can the use of alternative and renewable energy provide base 
stations with the capacity to be self-sustainable, no longer reliant 
on grid power?  
• How could proposed changes to base stations affect the 
construction of the NPSBN? 
D. METHOD  
The increasing role of smart phones and mobile devices supported by cellular 
technology cannot be ignored, as it is leveraged in every aspect of our daily lives—to the 
extent that many no longer require a home phone. This trend has caused the telecom 
industry to revaluate maintaining the legacy infrastructure supporting home phones for 
service provided over the airwaves through BSs. As the benefits offered are tremendous, 
such as ubiquitous coverage; the inherent fragility experienced during power outages is 
marginalized. The U.S. government will need to evaluate if this trade off is an acceptable 
risk. An account of disasters occurring during the past ten years has shown how unstable 
U.S. communications infrastructure has become. More importantly the strategic direction 
proposed by telecoms to migrate to a predominantly wireless business model limiting 
overall network diversity might create a risk too great to allow. 
This research method included four steps: 
1. The initial objective of this research was to determine if there were 
common reasons for BS failure. Three storms were analyzed: 1) Hurricane Katrina, 2) 
Derecho, and 3) Superstorm Sandy. These particular storms were sampled because they 
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occurred in the United States within the past 10 years and due to the significant impact 
they had on telecommunications systems. Each inflicted damage to various segments of 
critical infrastructure, affecting the ability for the public and first responders to 
communicate and coordinate rescue and recovery. The researcher reviewed contributing 
factors that lead to various telecom failures caused by these storms in an effort to detect 
commonalities, if any. The identification of these common causes for service disruption 
was used to develop mitigating strategies.  
The major components of the telecom network were assessed, specifically 
focusing on their interdependency. Base stations were examined to determine how they 
functioned once grid power was lost. The researcher explored how telecom service 
providers planned to provide coverage during power outages. This entailed an assessment 
of the back-up power supply installed at BSs. BS locations were also factored in to 
determine the impact of tidal surge, or physical damage from high winds. The data 
utilized for the analysis came from the FCC government publications, such as after action 
reports, lessons learned assessments, Congressional research, peer reviewed journal 
articles, and press releases. Using storms provides obvious limitations as other kinds of 
natural disasters may affect BSs differently. However, examining storms was useful, 
because they are the most common.  
2. The researcher then examined the strategic direction taken by the Indian 
government to increase resilience within the country’s mobile cellular network utilizing 
renewable energy. India was used as a comparative model because of its enormous 
cellular network consisting of 400,000 BSs, which is greater in size than the U.S. (at 
300,000). The country was also selected to analyze how they provide continuous cellular 
service with an inadequate power grid that fails frequently. Their practices offer a model 
for U.S. telecoms to handle power outages. The policy decisions and time frame outlined 
in their strategic plans reflects how a nation with a larger cellular network is capable of 
migrating to renewable/alternative energy, and the practicality of achieving such a goal. 
In addition, the researcher sought to answer if implementing such a policy in the United 
States would allow base stations to provide continuous service during power failure. The 
Indian government’s strategy to improve telecommunications resilience is reflected in 
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NTP-2012. The NTP-2012 posits the technological and conceptual framework for India 
to achieve economic superiority globally through a robust commercial mobile cellular 
network. It also envisions reducing the country’s costly dependence on imported diesel, 
while lowering harmful carbon emissions. This perspective plays a significant part in 
what U.S. telecoms should envision achieving.  
An analysis of the NTP-2012 was conducted to evaluate the strategic application 
for the commercial mobile cellular infrastructure of the United States. Ultimately the 
changes considered for the U.S. would be implemented to harden base station operational 
capacity. Hardening provides supplemental protection to include redundant connectivity, 
backup power, and structural integrity for BSs.37 To determine the practicality of this 
policy for U.S. deployment, the researcher focused on the core concepts that draw direct 
parallel to U.S. governance of telecommunications practices. The primary objective was 
to consider what changes should be implemented and to identify the agency best suited to 
carry it out. The data used for this analysis relied on the NTP-2012, journal articles, press 
releases, the Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 2012, academic studies and industry reports. 
3. The researcher further considered whether the use of alternative and 
renewable energy would provide base stations with the capacity to be self-sustainable, no 
longer reliant on grid power. Renewable/alternative energy were explored, which would 
support the global goals of lowering harmful carbon emissions produced by diesel 
generators, the predominant back-up power supply for BSs, along with the increased role 
in supporting remote telecom installations. For example, providing power to BSs in areas 
not supported by commercial grid power. In order to do so, an exploration of the 
limitations in conventional modes of powering BSs and how they react during power 
outages was undertaken. Subsequently, alternative, and renewable energy were examined 
to determine if they could provide ample back-up power during power failure, with the 
potential for self-sustainable capacity independent of grid power.  
The researcher reviewed both traditional modes of providing power to BSs (to 
include AC grid power, diesel generators, and battery), and alternative and renewable 
37  Moore, The First Responder’s Network and Next-Generation Communications for Public Safety: 
Issues for Congress. 
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forms of energy to include fuel cells, photovoltaic (solar), and wind. The data included 
industry reports, academic research, journal articles, government publications to include 
congressional research, Department of Energy, and after action reports.  
4. Finally, the researcher assessed how proposed changes to base stations 
could affect the construction of the NPSBN. The NPSBN was factored into this research 
because of its potential dependency on the commercial cellular network. The fragility of 
the U.S. commercial cellular network has direct implications for NPSBN to provide 
mission critical capacity to first responders. An exploration of the NPSBN was 
undertaken as this public safety network is proposed to provide interoperable 
communications across the country to first responders from various agencies and 
jurisdiction over cellular technology and infrastructure. The agreed upon standard it will 
operate over, 4G-LTE, is nascent within the commercial wireless industry. There has not 
been an official directive issued by FirstNet, the sanctioned authority overseeing its 
construction to have the NPSBN operate over the commercial cellular network or 
construct and entirely new public safety network.  
The implications of this research highlight current technological and construction 
deficiencies within the U.S. commercial cellular network. The purpose of this analysis is 
to provide FirstNet with an opportunity to evaluate policy and cost implications to either 
construct an entirely new public safety cellular network or work with the FCC and 
telecom service providers to propose changes to harden the commercial network in order 
to provide the expected operational capacity to support first responders. The researcher 
analyzed the Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 2012, which outlines how the NPSBN 
should operate in order to determine what is conceptualized for the NPSBN. The analysis 
was limited to the infrastructure proposed for the NPSBN and concentrated on how BSs 
would support its functionality during power outages. The data for the analysis came 
from the Middle Class Tax Relief Act of 2012, the 9/11 Commissions Recommendations, 
congressional hearings, government reports, the Federal Communications Commission, 
telecommunications companies, journal articles, and press releases.  
There are inherent limitations associated with determining the actual cost of 
equipping a BS with renewable/alternative energy, which is dependent on the physical 
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location of the structure. For the NPBSN, there are multiple layers beyond BSs that have 
significant effects on the performance of the network that are beyond the scope of this 
research as well.   
E. OVERVIEW OF UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
The upcoming chapters comprise the following:  
II. The Literature Review. The available literature addresses: 1) mobile cellular 
networks and the lack of resilience during natural disasters, 2) India’s National 
Telecommunications Policy for 2012, 3) alternative and renewable forms of primary and 
back-up power for base stations, and 4) the National Public Safety Broadband Network.  
III. Contributing Factors Leading To Base Station Failure. Since 2005, several 
natural disasters have caused major disruptions in telecommunications systems. 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), Derecho (2012), and Superstorm Sandy (2012) are examined 
for their specific impact on telecommunication networks and the difficulties experienced 
because of potential deficiencies. Within this section, the researcher reviewed the 
contributing factors that lead to the various failures caused by these storms in an effort to 
identify commonalities, if any.  
IV. Communications Limitations for First Responders At Emergency Incidents. 
Within this section, a glance at major historic events relating to public safety 
communications failures for first responders are considered, and how they lead to the 
creation of the National Public Safety Broadband Network. There is a chronological  
explanation of the legislation, congressional hearings, and ultimately the passage of the 
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 that codifies the requirements and 
parameters to build the NPSBN.  
V. India’s Economic Growth and the Role of Renewable/Alternative Energy in Its 
Mobile Cellular Network. Within this section, an exploration of India’s economy is 
undertaken analyzing specific policy changes responsible for foreign investment, lowered 
foreign oil dependence, and the role of mobile cellular communication. There is also an 
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examination of alternative/renewable energy’s potential role supporting BSs power 
requirements for back up and primary use.  
VI. India’s Mobile Telecommunications Strategy, A Model for U.S. Application. 
India’s NTP strategy is a culmination of the nation’s commitment to achieving economic 
superiority through technological advancements in mobile cellular infrastructure. There is 
also a parallel effort to provide socio-economic parity to its under serviced majority 
population with equal emphasis on environmental consciousness. There are four main 
strategies targeted within the NTP that have direct implications for U.S. application: 1) 
Expanding its commercial mobile wireless network to rural underdeveloped regions with 
inadequate grid power, 2) Creating a robust resilient mobile wireless network capable of 
withstanding disasters both natural and manmade, 3) Incentives for corporate adoption 
and 4) Investing in renewable/alternative energy to power base stations in order to lower 
fossil fuel dependency and harmful carbon emissions. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The available literature addresses: 1) Mobile cellular networks and the lack of 
resilience during natural disasters, 2) India’s National Telecommunications Policy for 
2012, 3) Alternative and renewable forms of primary and back-up power for base 
stations, and 4) The National Public Safety Broadband Network. The core body of 
literature is produced by: the FCC, Department of Energy, and other government 
publications to include the Indian government, peer-reviewed journal articles, press 
releases, research and development from energy and telecommunications companies, 
scientific periodicals, academic think tanks, and wireless mobile carrier publications.    
A. THE IMPACT OF NATURAL DISASTERS ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
There is extensive literature analyzing the impact of natural disasters on critical 
infrastructure. However, a minority provides context on the telecommunications 
perspective. Within this compilation of literature, a consensus purports that the 
commercial mobile cellular networks are fragile—exhibiting an acute dependency on grid 
power. The October 2012 issue of New York Times Business Day-Technology reported on 
the impact of Superstorm Sandy, illustrating how BSs have a critical dependency on grid 
power: “Power system failures throughout the Northeast have been the main culprits in 
the shutdown of more than 20 percent of the cell towers in 10 states.”38  The collection of 
literature within this subsection is produced from press releases, peer-reviewed journal 
articles, telecommunications research and development labs, and government after action 
reports.  
The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned 2006 offers 
context for how Hurricane Katrina affected overall critical infrastructure cascading to 
telecommunication failure through the experiences encountered by industry personnel 
and emergency managers:  
38  Edward Wyatt and Brian Chen, “FCC Details Storm-Related Cellphone Problems,” The New York 
Times, sec. Business Day-Technology, October 31, 2012. 
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D.H.S should review our current laws, policies and strategies relevant to 
communications…with support from the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, should develop a national emergency communications 
strategy that supports communications operability and interoperability.39   
The document offers an overall assessment with limited analysis on the mobile 
cellular network. The report ultimately postulate support for a National Interoperable 
Public Safety Network.  
A more extensive and detailed assessment regarding the telecommunications 
impact caused by Katrina can be found in an article sponsored by the National Science 
Foundation (NSF), titled “Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment Caused 
by Hurricane Katrina—Site Survey and Follow—Up Results” by Kwasinski, et al. The 
article analyzes how telecommunications were disrupted through key points of failure in 
power distribution—affecting both wired and wireless networks. It proposes mitigating 
strategies with the consensus view on BSs migrating away from grid power, to renewable 
energy (photovoltaic), and alternative fuels. 40   Kwasinski, et al. recommends, “the 
telecom industry should develop a common infrastructure design and construction 
guideline for coastal areas with high risk of hurricanes, as it is done in earthquake prone 
regions.”41   
Supplementing the Katrina Telecommunications analysis is an article titled 
“Critical Infrastructure Analysis of Telecom for Natural Disasters,” produced by Bell 
Laboratories, Lucent Technologies, and Sandia National Laboratories.42 The analysts 
utilized the Network Simulation Modeling and Analysis Research Tool (N-SMART), 
“developed to support detailed wireline and wireless network simulation,”43 to run ad hoc 
simulations on the impact from natural disasters. The study conducted various 
39  United States, Executive Office of the President, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, White House, 2006. 
40 Ibid. 
41  A. Kwasinski et al., “Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane 
Katrina– Site Survey and Follow-Up Results,” Systems Journal, IEEE 3, no. 3 (2009):  277–287. 
42 O’Reilly et al., “Critical Infrastructure Analysis of Telecom for Natural Disasters,” 2006. 
43  Roger M. Whitaker, Larry Raisanen, and Steve Hurley, “The Infrastructure Efficiency of Cellular 
Wireless Networks,” Computer Networks 48, no. 6 (August 19, 2005), 1. 
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telecommunications model testing with alternative strategies. The prevailing strategy 
relied on a readily accessible supply of fuel to keep generators operating; an issue Sandy 
proved problematic in the event of a fuel supply disruption.  
The Federal Communication Commission’s “Impact of the June 2012 Derecho on 
Communications Network and Services, Report and Recommendations, January 2013” 
provides a detailed overview of how the telecom infrastructure reacted to the Derecho. 
The report separates various components within the wired and wireless network and 
offers context in support of the consensus view. For instance, it notes that, “the two main 
reasons reported for cell site outage were loss of power and the disabling of transport 
facilities that carry calls from cell sites to mobile switching centers.”44 The report offers a 
relational overview of the events that transpired beginning with the loss of power to how 
the dependent components within the telecom network reacted. Subsequently, it 
expanded on the cascading failures that ensued once central offices (COs) went off-line 
from faulty diesel generators that failed to start. The report expands on current strategies 
employed by telecom service providers to provide back-up power to BSs, and COs 
commenting on their limitations; “cell towers began to lose all source of power 
(commercial, battery, generator) in the hours and days after the storm had dissipated.”45 
The use of batteries and diesel generators by telecom industry is replicated across the 
swath of literature. The literature also draws attention to service providers failing to track 
and identify what form of back-up power is installed and to which specific BSs.  
An overview of the impact of Superstorm Sandy is outlined in the “NYS 2100 
Commission Recommendations to Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire 
State’s Infrastructure, January 2013.” An important factor is how the report defines 
“resilience [as] the ability of a system to withstand shocks and stresses while still 
maintaining its essential functions.”46  The document provides an overall assessment of 
New York State’s critical infrastructure and looks at deficiencies in multiple sectors. It 
44  Federal Communication Commission, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho on Communications 
Network and Services. Report and Recommendations, 2013, 36. 
45 Ibid. 
46  Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
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does not offer any specific recommendations in telecommunications. However, it does 
propose expanding NYS’s commitment to pursue renewable energy, by offering 
incentives for the private sector to invest in alternative fuel sources. There are strategies 
proposed to offset the loss of grid power by creating micro-grids. “The ‘grid’ does not 
sufficiently allow, and certain regulatory requirements discourage, power sources and 
customers to be ‘islanded’ or run as a micro-grid to allow outages to be confined and 
enable more rapid recovery.”47 The report also postulates how investing in renewable 
energy will further enhance the states efforts in support of the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
initiative (RGGI) “an effort among nine Northeast and mid-Atlantic states to reduce CO 
emissions.”48 
The compilation of available literature offers insight from analyzing the events 
that transpired during and after these storms. They provide consensus on the limited 
operational capacity of the equipment installed by telecom providers to provide back-up 
power. For example, the use of batteries provided mere hours of additional service for 
BSs. The literature brings up a significant point—how service providers are not 
accounting for what forms of back-up power is actually installed to which BSs. The 
majority of the literature identified the practice of equipping diesel generators to BSs as 
unreliable due to the critical dependency on accessible fuel. Finally, the literature agrees 
on transitioning to renewable/alternative forms of energy to provide primary and back-up 
power to BSs.  
B. INDIA’S ECONOMY AND MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION 
NETWORK  
The available literature on India’s economic growth and Telecommunications 
strategy is compiled from the National Telecom Policy 2012, press releases, business and 
economic journals, the World Fact Book, and academic research.  
The literature offers insight into what specific sectors propelled the country from 
dismal economic times to a competitor for world economic power. Dushyant Gosai 
47 Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
48 Ibid. 
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outlines relevant changes made to stimulate India’s economy in an article for the 
International Policy Digest.49 “There were three major driving forces behind India’s 
economic growth and prosperity after economic reforms of 1991; Increased foreign direct 
investment, India’s expertise in information technology and increased domestic 
consumption because of a growing middle class population.”50 The article goes on to 
mention the projected decrease in GDP according to Morgan Stanley and HSBC, which 
forecast fiscal years 2013 and 2014 from 5.2 to 5 percent and from 6.2 to 6 percent. Even 
with the drop in GDP, India is still positioned to out perform the U.S. and European 
economies.51   
As India continues to develop, it is poised to expand its economic potential and 
growth second only to China. A major sector recognized to support this effort is 
telecommunications. India’s National Telecom Policy-2012 states, “Telecommunications 
has emerged as a key driver of economic and social development in an increasingly 
knowledge intense global scenario, in which India needs to play a leadership role.”52  The 
document outlines a national strategy to leverage technology as an equalizer in providing 
essential services such as health, education, and employment to its population. More 
importantly the document equates a robust mobile cellular network as the primary 
mechanism to expand the nation’s capacity to generate revenue from mobile commerce. 
It also recognizes the economic stagnation within its rural areas is a factor of limited to 
nonexistent telecommunications services. This key segment represents the majority 
population at 68 percent, which the NTP identifies as the main demographic to fuel 
India’s future growth.   
The telecom market in India has experienced significant progress over the past 
decade propelled specifically by the mobile phone market. As of February 2012, there 
were 943 million telephone connections with the “cellular segment, which alone 
49  Dushyant Gosai, “History of Economic Growth in India,” 
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2013/04/24/history-of-economic-growth-in-india/. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. 
52  India’s National Telecom Policy - 2012. 
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accounted for 911 million connections.” 53   The “NTP-2012…[envisions] leveraging 
telecom infrastructure to enable all citizens and businesses, both rural and urban areas, to 
participate in the Internet and web economy, thereby ensuring equitable and inclusive 
development across the nation.” The document emphasizes the need for resilience within 
its telecom network by adequately preparing to mitigate natural and manmade disasters. 
The NTP further expands on how it will reach remote areas within the country that are 
not serviced by commercial grid power.  
The document emphasizes the continued use and expansion of renewable energy 
to off set the country’s reliance on diesel with aggressive milestones targeted over the 
next few years. The NTP-2012 provides India with a framework to achieve a national 
mobile telecommunication network capable of supporting private sector growth with 
parallel support for government security.  
Finally, an article written by Jim O’Neill titled, “A 10-Step Program for India’s 
Economy” lays out how to keep India on track to arrive at its economic potential. The 
document proposes specific sectors that need additional attention by the Indian 
government in order to continue growing its economy. For example, step ten states, 
“Protect the environment. India can’t achieve 8.5 percent growth for the next 30 to 40 
years unless it takes steps to safeguard environmental quality and use energy and other 
resources more efficiently. Encouraging the private sector to invest in sustainable 
technologies can boost growth in its own right.”54   
The compilation of literature within this section provides consensus that India’s 
economy requires further investment in sustainable resources, if it is to continue growing 
to its full potential. The inadequate commercial power grid provides challenges for their 
growth. The core political direction with the NTP provides structure for a sustainable 
future through the use of a robust cellular network. In order to have that network 
functioning at required capacity, renewable/alternative energy will play a significant part.  
 
53  India’s National Telecom Policy - 2012.  
54  Jim O’Neill, “A 10-Step Program for India’s Economy,” Bloomberg.com, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/201300-622-3/a-10-step-program-for-india-s-economy.html. 
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There is limited information available within the NTP that identify how they will remedy 
their faulty commercial power grid. This presents a significant problem for the country’s 
future prosperity. 
C. ALTERNATIVE AND RENEWABLE ENERGY FOR BASE STATIONS 
The literature surrounding renewable and alternate energy for cellular BSs is 
compiled from various scientific periodicals, research and development of energy 
companies, peer-reviewed journal articles, the U.S. Department of Energy, 
nongovernment organizations, and government publications. The overall consensus 
shows an increase in research and development to meet projected usage in order to lessen 
the demand for fossil fuels. Further, the primary mitigating strategy in the majority of 
literature calls for using renewable/alternative energy within mobile cellular 
infrastructure to provide resilience along with lowering carbon emissions created by 
diesel powered backup power generators.  
The available literature looks at the ever-increasing role renewable/alternative 
energy is playing in the telecom industry for both primary and back-up power. The U.S. 
Department of Energy has supported the expansion of mobile cellular networks utilizing 
alternative energy for some years now as seen in an article titled “The Greening of 
XOHM” October 2008. Sprint, along with U.S. Department of Energy and the 
Environmental Protection Agency, embarked on a campaign to bring attention to local 
communities regarding the safety of fuel cells.55  The article goes on to discuss how 
Sprint proposed expanding its cellular network to incorporate fuel cell alternatives as a 
back-up power source for its BSs.  
Alternative energy fuel cells have continued to increase their role in cellular 
networks providing reliable back-up power, as noted in an article produced by U.S. 
Department of Energy titled “Calling All Fuel Cells,” December 2012. The article 
highlights how cell towers equipped with fuel cells for back-up power provided 
continuous service to areas impacted by Superstorm Sandy. There is a comparison of how 
fuel cells performed against their diesel generator counterparts. Cell towers equipped 
55  Kevin Fitchard, “The Greening of XOHM,” Telephony 249, no. 14, (Oct 2008), 39.  
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with fuel cells operated without issue, while those equipped with batteries or diesel 
powered generators were affected by the storm.56  The article does not specify the exact 
locations these devices were deployed to, nor does it offer context on how service 
providers would be expanding their usage.  
Literature depicts India at the forefront of the global transition away from fossil 
fuel dependent mobile cellular base stations to eco-friendly technology and design where 
alternative and renewable energy is at the core of its strategy. Katherine Tweed states in 
an article written for Scientific America titled Why Cellular Towers in Developing 
Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power, “India, which has about 400,000 base 
stations, the government has mandated that 50 percent of rural sites be powered by 
renewables by 2015.”57  The article further expands on the increased cost of fossil fuel 
and how utilizing alternative and renewable energy will eventually be significantly 
cheaper. There is additional literature produced from scientific journals providing a 
comparison of diesel generators, which is the primary source of back-up power for BSs 
and the savings offered by renewables.58  The literature also identifies how using new 
technology can lower overall power consumption of BSs, which is a significant 
component in making renewables/alternative energy a viable alternative.  
Additional literature illustrates how entire cities have already begun adopting 
renewable energy to support cellular communications. For instance, Indus Towers,’ an 
Indian telecom service provider have strategically employed renewables to Mumbai, 
calling it a “Green City.”59  There are examples offered by renewable energy companies 
that have already deployed alternative and renewable energy to various islands that were 
directly impacted by hurricanes and were able to continue to function days after grid 
power was lost. Such examples support and offer context for potential U.S. application.  
56  Sunita Satyapal, “Calling all Fuel Cells,” Department of Energy, http://energy.gov/articles/calling-
all-fuel-cells. 
57  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
58  Naikodi, Solar-Wind Hybrid Power for Rural Indian Cell Sites, 69–72. 
59 “Indus Towers’ Sites Turn Green in Mumbai.”  
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The compilation of literature within this section offers practical application on 
how to apply renewable and alternative energy to mobile cellular networks for both 
primary and back-up power. BSs operating on renewable/alternative energy during major 
storms provide empirical data to employ onto the U.S. commercial cellular network. For 
example, after Superstorm Sandy struck the Caribbean and the East Coast, at least 100 
cell towers equipped with fuel cells in the Bahamas and the Northeast United States 
continued to operate without commercial grid power.60  Acquiring the location and length 
of time these BSs functioned independent of grid power provides a good use case. 
Ultimately, the use of renewables/alternative energy supports the global consensus of 
lowering carbon emissions while increasing the performance of the cellular network. 
Such efforts are integral to lower our dependence on fossil fuel reflective within New 
York State’s 2100 Commission Recommendations, which notes: “to build on the success 
of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), the state should encourage alternative 
fuel sources.”61 
D. THE NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY BROADBAND NETWORK  
Many recommendations came from the 9/11 Commission Report that created 
sweeping reforms in government. The report raises a major national issue of how 
emergency incidents are managed and the lack of interoperable communications among 
various agencies and jurisdictions, which supported the creation of a National Public 
Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN).62 “The inability to communicate was a critical 
element at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash 
sites, where multiple jurisdictions responded.”63   
60  “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters.” Fuel Cells 2000 and 
the Breakthrough Technologies Institute, 
http://www.fuelcells.org/base.cgim?template=reports_and_case_studies. 
61  Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure, 15. 
62  Federal Communication Commission, “700 MHz Spectrum,” FCC, 
http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/700-mhz-spectrum. 
63  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (New York: Norton, 
2004), 397. 
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The majority of literature available related to the Public Safety Network is 
compiled from Congressional hearings, government reports, and technical background 
provided by the FCC. The F.C.C Encyclopedia 64  offers a historical overview, with 
significant context on legislation and activities supporting the efforts to create a National 
Public Safety Network.  
The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 65  provide the 
necessary framework for developing the NPSBN. It lays out the core specifications to be 
followed, such as, initial funding, radio spectrum allocation, network architecture, 
platform standardization, while creating the First Responder Network Authority 
(FirstNet)—ultimately responsible to oversee the NPSBN’s construction.  
There is consensus in the need to have an interoperable communications network 
for first responders. The arrival and acceptance across mobile telecom service providers 
to migrate to 4G-LTE provides a substantial coverage area for the NPSBN to leverage.66   
However, there is debate on the network model to be used, which is proposed to leverage 
commercial or government constructed cellular base stations or a hybrid of both. Some 
public safety advocates voice the need to create a separate public safety network that does 
not cross over to the commercial infrastructure. This strategy is time intensive and cost 
prohibitive. Others view the use of commercial cellular infrastructure as a reasonable way 
to quickly stand up the NPSBN within a reasonable and cost effective time frame. 
Finally, there are those who feel there is practicality in having both networks; however, 
the public safety component should provide supplemental coverage in areas where the 
commercial network is lacking. Whichever method is chosen, the ultimate criticality is 
the need for BSs to be hardened against commercial power grid failure.67 
64  Federal Communication Commission, 700 MHz Spectrum. 
65  Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 126 stat. 15611-26 Stat., 256. 
66  L. K. Moore, Public Safety Communications and Spectrum Resources: Policy Issues for Congress 
DIANE Publishing, 2010. 
67 Ibid. 
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E. GAPS IN LITERATURE 
There is a dearth of information regarding the length of time base stations can or 
have functioned during power outages. Further, there is no form of record keeping 
identifying the type of equipment installed to provide back-up power for BSs. This fact is 
brought to light in The Impact of the June 2012 Derecho, which notes: “It appears that 
most of the major providers do not retain records of or analyze the actual lifespan of their 
cell site batteries when they support the site during a loss of commercial or generator 
power.”68  Additionally, BSs equipped with alternative energy back-up power sources 
that continued to function after the loss of grid power during Superstorm Sandy were not 
mapped. This information is vital, permitting telecom service providers and government 
agencies to realistically forecast which areas would be without cell phone access and how 
long the battery capacity would operate. Having such information in advance potentially 
presents efficiencies in resource deployment to standup portable cell cites or cellular on 
wheels (COWs) in areas that have no battery back-up capacity or limited alternative 
energy BSs. The researcher did not consider the emerging LightRadio technology 
currently under development by Alcatel-Lucent69 that offers the potential to provide 
cellular service in a small device the size of ones hand. This technology may prove to 
disrupt the need for actual cell towers in the near future. However, there is limited 





68  A Report of The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho 
on Communications Network and Services. Report and Recommendations, 39. 
69  Alan Burkitt-Gray, “Operators ‘Ready to Try’ Bell Labs’ Cubes in Small-Cell LTE, Says Alcatel-
Lucent’s Marcus Weldon.”  
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III. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS LEADING TO BASE STATION 
FAILURE  
Since 2005, several natural disasters have caused major disruptions in 
telecommunications’ systems. Hurricane Katrina (2005), Derecho (2012), and 
Superstorm Sandy (2012) are examined for their specific impact on telecommunication 
networks and the difficulties experienced because of potential deficiencies. Within this 
section, the contributing factors are reviewed that lead to the various failures caused by 
these storms in an effort to identify commonalities, if any. The major components of the 
telecom network were analyzed, with emphasis on their interdependency, as well as 
external logistic factors that play a key dependent role, such as the supply of fuel.  
A. KATRINA 
On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina became the most destructive natural 
disaster in U.S. history, striking with 115–130 mph winds and intense storm surges, 
leaving the Gulf Coast region with 96 billion dollars in damages, over 1300 deaths, and 
300,000 homes destroyed.70 The storm impacted every aspect of telecom systems within 
the Gulf, damaging central offices (CO), cell tower base stations (BS), severing 
transmission links and disrupting the flow of petroleum—needed to keep portable 
generators running. It “caused complete communications failure which hampered rescue 
efforts…and made calls for aid impossible from the hardest hit areas.”71  The major 
phone carrier within the region, BellSouth, along with the major wireless carriers,  
experienced approximately 3 million lines out of service during peak hours of 
operation.72  The majority of damage inflicted by Katrina can be attributed to storm surge 
followed by flooding.73   
70  Executive Office of the President, United States. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 
71  Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 277–287, 1. 
72  O’Reilly et al., Critical Infrastructure Analysis of Telecom for Natural Disasters, 1–6. 
73 A. Kwasinski, “Effects of Notable Natural Disasters from 2005 to 2011 on Telecommunications 
Infrastructure: Lessons from on-Site Damage Assessments,” 2011, 3. 
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In order to identify potential interdependencies, in the telecom network the 
researcher utilized the analysis produced in Telecommunications Power Plant Damage 
Assessment Caused by Hurricane Katrina—Site Survey and Follow-Up Results by 
Kwasinski et al. The analysis started with: 1) The power supply, 2) Central Offices, 3) 
Transmission links, and 4) Cell site base stations (BS). The report noted the centralized 
network components received far greater damage in comparison to the distributed side.74  
This resulted in cascading failures across the network to ancillary sites that drew 
connectivity and routing from Central Offices, such as BSs. The damage inflicted on COs 
was a function of their location within flood zones. Other mitigating circumstances 
related to construction practices. For example, certain COs were built on elevated 
foundations, or located on high floors, which were able to withstand the flooding.75  
Eighteen central offices became inoperable from a lack of fuel to power their onsite 
generators.76  
There are approximately 3,000 base stations in the area affected by Katrina that 
sustained minimum damage. The predominant damage to BSs resulted from inconsistent 
construction practices. The majority of damaged BSs were located below the flood plane, 
while others outside of this area were affected minimally.77  For the remaining BSs that 
remained intact, grid power dependency proved vital. Once the loss of power occurred, 
their battery banks lasted for mere hours. The lack of permanently installed back-up 
generators exacerbated the situation—those few sites equipped with generators quickly 
exhausted whatever fuel was initially on hand. The delivery of fuel became an issue due 
to the disruption of local fuel supply and obstructed roadways.78  
74  Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 1. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Kwasinski, Effects of Notable Natural Disasters from 2005 to 2011 on Telecommunications 
Infrastructure: Lessons from on-Site Damage Assessments, 1–9. 
77 Ibid., 2. 
78  Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 4. 
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The overall damage to the telecom network in Katrina resulted in the failure of 
COs; caused by storm surge and faulty and fuel depleted diesel generators, which caused 
a chain reaction to downstream dependent BSs. In totaling, the lack of standardization 
where COs and BSs were constructed resulted in significant damage that could have been 
avoided. There were several recommendations made by Kwasinski et al. supporting the 
researcher’s claim that BS reliability and continuity from the loss of grid power can be 
improved using renewable/alternative energy. “A better solution is to seek more 
independence from the electric grid by installing a permanent solar-assisted power plant 
to ease genset fuel demand after disasters and reduce operational cost yearlong.”79 After 
reviewing the critical failures in mobile cellular communications related to the loss of 
power, the FCC mandated that BSs be equipped with at least eight hours of back-up 
power.80  Unfortunately, service providers successfully overturned this mandate in court. 
Finally, the Katrina lessons learned document recommended that D.H.S should work with 
the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop a national emergency 
communications strategy that supports both operability and interoperability—referencing 
current laws, policies, and strategies relevant to communications.81   
B. DERECHO 
On June 29, 2012, the Derecho windstorm struck the mid-Atlantic region of the 
U.S. with minimal warning, knocking telecommunications and 9–1-1 operations off-line, 
inflicting twenty-two deaths, and leaving millions of customers without power—for some 
up to two weeks. The storm traveled six hundred miles in ten hours, with winds in excess 
of 60 mph impacting eleven states and the District of Columbia.82 A Derecho, as defined 
by The National Weather Service is “a widespread, long-lived wind storm that is 
79   Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 4. 
80 “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters.”  
81  Executive Office of the President, United States. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 
82  A Report of The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho 
on Communications Network and Services. Report and Recommendations. 
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associated with a band of rapidly moving showers or thunderstorms.83 In comparison to 
other storms, Derechos strikes with very little advance warning, similar to earthquakes, 
tornados, and man-made events for which there is minimal time for preparation.84    
An interesting perspective with this particular storm is how it disrupted the 
telecom network not by physical damage or storm surge, but rather as an indirect 
consequence of the loss of grid power. Central offices (COs), which BSs connect to via 
fiber or microwave, were the first part of the telecom network affected by the Derecho. 
The Impact of the June 2012 Derecho on Communications Networks and Services notes: 
“Communications failure resulted, in significant part, from the loss of commercial power 
followed by generator failures.”85  COs were equipped with diesel generators to provide 
continuous service in the event of power failure. However, they were not as reliable as 
they were thought too be and crippled the downstream components that were reliant on a 
functioning COs, such as BSs. Nine out of 136 central offices experienced inoperable 
backup generators, leading to massive service interruptions throughout the region. 86 
Derecho caused partial and complete service outages to 9–1-1, as a result of damage 
inflicted on the wireline telecom infrastructure, which extended for several days.87  
The physical integrity of cell tower base stations withstood the impact of 
Derecho; however, this did not negate the loss of functionality once grid power was lost. 
Faulty generators and backup batteries that were equipped to certain BSs depleted 
rapidly.88   Base stations were not designed or equipped with components capable of 
providing extended functionality during power outages. Batteries were the first layer of 
defense against the loss of power, providing operational capacity for a few hours. An 
unknown number of BSs were equipped with diesel generators, which were relied on to 
provide extended power beyond batteries. They too did not function as initially thought, 
83  “ABOUT DERECHOS,” NOAA, http://www.spc.noaa.gov/misc/AbtDerechos/derechofacts.htm. 
84  A Report of The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho 
on Communications Network and Services. Report and Recommendations, 1. 





                                                 
and as such, failed to provide extended operational capacity to BSs. The inconsistency in 
equipping BSs with an appropriate back-up power source, created a cellular network that 
could not be relied upon during such a catastrophe, and as such perpetuated 
communications failure.  
The initial cell site failures attributable to a combination of wire-line transport 
(back-haul), which resulted from COs going off-line due to faulty diesel generators not 
starting, and the inability of BSs to operate continuously without a functioning power 
grid. As BS did not receive substantial damage from the direct impact of the storm, their 
first level of failure manifested from the inability to route their communications to the 
wired network, which is brokered by COs. The wireline failure cascaded across the 
network, responsible for the greatest service losses experienced in northern Virginia once 
Verizon’s Arlington and Fairfax central offices loss functionality due to failed backup 
power.89   
Within the following days, failure transitioned from the physical wire-line 
transport to insufficient battery and generator capacity as repairs to the back-haul 
infrastructure started to return online.90  As repairs brought COs to operational capacity, 
BSs were still without grid power and lacked the ability to operate without it. The report 
draws attention to the U.S. telecom network design and limitation during power outages 
highlighting the severity of backup power for cell sites. There is additional emphasis on 
service providers failing to track the amount of time batteries are actually powering cell 
sites during power outages. The lack of this information creates a void in forecasting 
service disruptions of the actual mobile wireless network. The Derecho revealed how 
interdependent telecom systems are and how sensitive they are dependent on power. 
 
89  A Report of The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho 
on Communications Network and Services. Report and Recommendations, 1. 
90 Ibid. 
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C. SUPERSTORM SANDY 
On October 29, 2012, Superstorm Sandy struck the East Coast of the U.S., leaving 
damage second only to Hurricane Katrina alone. The majority damage inflicted on the 
New York coastline stemmed from high winds and record-breaking high tides. The storm 
wrecked critical infrastructure, resulted in over 140 fatalities directly related to its impact, 
and caused damage in excess of $50 billion.91   Widespread power outages were seen 
across Lower Manhattan resulting from flooded substations inundated by record setting 
storm surge.92  Superstorm Sandy severely degraded the copper landline infrastructure, 
which supports conventional telecom services that have been around for over a 100 years. 
As services are slowly restored to these communities in the North East, they will no 
longer be provided via copper landline. Verizon has chosen to provide telephone services 
to residents by wireless only access, with increased cost and less overall service. 
Residents will not have ability to fax, connect alarm systems, or more important connect 
medical devices to their doctors office for monitoring.93  This decision is in line with the 
telecom industries overall goal of abandoning landlines by 2020.94   
The vast telecom failure throughout New York City resulted from a cascading 
effect triggered from the loss of grid power. This was attributed to substation failure due 
to flooding and manual shutdowns implemented by Con Edison, as a protective measure 
to limit the destruction of energized underground equipment.95 Manhattan experienced a 
power outage that extended south of 39th street. At the onset of power failure, telecom 
systems operated on back-up power, if they were so equipped—consisting primarily of 
batteries or diesel generators. These stopgap measures provided minimum continuity of 
services.  
91  E. S. Blake, T. B. Kimberlain, R. Berg, J. P. Cangialosi, and J. L. Beven II, Tropical Cyclone 
Report Hurricane Sandy, National Hurricane Center, 2013. 
92  Matt Smith, “Sandy Wreaks Havoc Across Northeast; at Least 11 Dead,” CNN, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/29/us/tropical-weather-sandy/index.html. 
93 “Copper Telephone Lines Fade Away, Worrying Regulators and Consumers.”  
94 “Surprise! Your High-Tech Home Phone System could Go Dead in an Emergency.”  
95  Smith, Sandy Wreaks Havoc Across Northeast; at Least 11 Dead. 
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The second layer of telecom failure resulted from COs going off-line. Carew 
notes: “New York-based Verizon said the storm caused flooding at three Verizon central 
offices that hold telecom equipment in Lower Manhattan, as well as sites in Queens and 
Long Island.”96  Physical damage and loss of power caused these critical nodes in the 
telecom network to cease to function. The effects rippled to down stream components 
that were fed by these sites, such as cellular base stations.  
Cellular base stations were the final layer that failed to operate either from a lack 
of connectivity to COs or loss of primary grid power. The few that remained functional, 
running on either batteries or generators, if they were so equipped soon ceased operating 
once their diesel generators ran out of fuel. Sandy caused approximately twenty-five 
percent of cell towers in the region to fail. 97   The fuel shortage proved to be an 
unanticipated element in keeping BS generators running. The fragility of wireless cellular 
communications became very apparent once power was lost.  
The uniqueness of Sandy can be seen in the impact it had on several sectors other 
than telecommunications that created an unforeseen void. The Buckeye pipeline is the 
primary source for petroleum in NYC and Long Island—running at maximum capacity to 
meet continued demand.98  Once power was lost to this location, it created an acute 
shortage of fuel that took approximately two to three weeks to stabilize. The region was 
not prepared for such a shortage causing many critical facilities to cease operating. New 
York City Police Department’s Head Quarters and 9–1-1 operated on back-up diesel 
generators for five days. Airports within the region are fed directly from this pipeline and 
could not provide fuel for planes.  
 
96  Carew, Hurricane Sandy Disrupts Northeast U.S. Telecom Networks, 1. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
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D. COMMON TELECOM FAILURES CAUSED BY STORMS 
An analysis of Hurricane Katrina, Derecho, and Superstorm Sandy, exposes a 
systematic pattern of cell site failure triggered by several mutual factors associated with 
all three storms. The most common reason BSs cease to function were: 1) Commercial 
grid power failure, 2) Loss of wireline connectivity or back haul 3) Structural damage, 
and 4) Inadequate or lack of back-up power.99  Very few BSs within areas directly 
impacted by these storms remained operational. The most prevalent failure seen across 
the swath of data was attributed to inadequate back-up power capacity.100  An additional 
aspect of failure seen in Hurricane Katrina, and Superstorm Sandy was fuel starvation for 
those facilities or BSs equipped with diesel generators. 
The loss of connectivity or back-haul generally occurs when the physical link 
(fiber optic cable or high-power microwave antennas) between BSs and central offices 
(CO) or any other intermediary mobile telephone switching office (MTSO) has been 
severed.101 Another aspect that causes back-haul failure occurs when COs lose power, 
sustain physical damage or flooding. 102  This potentially creates a cascading effect, 
rippling throughout the network of adjoining BSs.103 Consider BSs to be at the furthest 
point or edge in a network, while COs are at the center. Once a CO is knocked off line as 
a result of power loss or physical damage, the nodes at the edge or down stream no longer 
have the ability to process communications requests without a redundant connection to 
another unaffected CO.  
An examination of BSs physically damaged by these storms illustrates a 
propensity for damage in certain likely locations. First, the area they were installed had a 
99  Executive Office of the President, United States, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 
and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. 
100  A Report of The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho 
on Communications Network and Services. Report and Recommendations. 
101  Graham Booker et al., “Estimating Cellular Network Performance during Hurricanes,” Reliability 
Engineering & System Safety 95, no. 4 (2010), 337–344. 
102  O’Reilly et al., Critical Infrastructure Analysis of Telecom for Natural Disasters, 6. 
103  Lewis, Bak’s Sand Pile: Strategies for a Catastrophic World. 
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significant probability of damage, if it was constructed in a known flood zone. 104  
Second, BSs built along coastal areas had a tendency to bear substantial flood damage.105  
The site survey provided by Kwasinski et al., of the areas impacted by Katrina offers 
insight how damage inflicted to BSs could have easily been averted, simply by 
constructing them outside of flood zones. Figure 1 is a map and diagram from 
Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment Caused by Hurricane Katrina—
Site Survey and Follow-up Results illustrating the severity of damage to BSs along the 
coastal and flood prone locations. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Map prepared by Kwasinksi et al. showing sampled cell site locations and 
predominant failure type zones.106  
104  Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 277–287. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 277–287. 
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Finally, natural disasters have a tendency to impact critical infrastructure, which 
often disturbs the fuel supply.107 Superstorm Sandy and Hurricane Katrina impacted 
various aspects of critical infrastructure such as roadways, transmission and distribution 
power lines, bridges and tunnels. Superstorm Sandy caused widespread power failures 
throughout the Eastern seaboard.108  The Buckeye pipeline ceased to operate as a result 
of the power grid going off-line. The pipeline serves as the main petroleum distribution 
hub for the North East. Once Buckeye stopped pumping, the impact rippled throughout 
the region resulting in an immediate shortage as the pipeline operates at capacity just to 
meet normal daily demands.109 The shortage extended in excess of two weeks, resulting 
in New York and New Jersey implementing gas rationing. BSs and other facilities 
employing diesel generators eventually experienced fuel starvation due to Buckeye’s 
failure.  
Hurricane Katrina caused extensive damage to the power grid in several states. 
Some states, for instance Mississippi, had two-thirds of the electrical transmission and 
distribution system destroyed. The extent of the damage left residents without power for 
several weeks.110  An illustration of how the impact of the fuel supply has a significant 
effect on telecommunications can be seen from the following example. Central offices 
rely heavily on diesel generators as their primary form of backup power. COs in 
Louisiana went off-line due to generator engine fuel starvation, related to local diesel 
supply and obstructed roadways—flooding was not a factor in these areas.111  
Considering this hypersensitivity to grid power and the inherent operational 
failure that follows, why haven’t wireless service providers proactively installed back-up 
power to BSs?  There may be two potential factors. First, the U.S. has a relatively stable 
power grid, 99.97 percent reliable, compared to developing countries. And as such, 
107  O’Reilly et al., Critical Infrastructure Analysis of Telecom for Natural Disasters, 1–6. 
108  Carew, Hurricane Sandy Disrupts Northeast U.S. Telecom Networks. 
109  Judith Rodin and Felix Rohatyn, Lazard, Co-Chairs, NYS 2100 Commission Recommendations to 
Improve the Strength and Resilience of the Empire State’s Infrastructure. 
110  Kwasinski et al., Telecommunications Power Plant Damage Assessment for Hurricane Katrina– 
Site Survey and Follow-Up Results, 277–287. 
111 Ibid. 
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service providers calculate loss of functionality due to power failures as marginal 
considering the low probability of occurrence.112  Second, there is a financial burden 
associated with retrofitting the 300,000 plus BSs nationwide. Although these 
considerations seem rational, they should not inhibit alternative cost-funded solutions to 
desist. In addition, the national upgrade to support the agreed upon next generation 
cellular standard 4G-LTE offers an opportune situation to incorporate appropriate back-
up power to BSs.  
112 “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters.”  
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IV. COMMUNICATION LIMITATIONS FOR FIRST 
RESPONDERS AT EMERGENCY INCIDENTS   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Catastrophic events thrust the public and first responders into chaos and 
ambiguity while the crisis continues to unfold. The success or failure of an emergency 
response significantly hinges on how critically mobilized personnel are able to 
communicate and coordinate resources amongst each other. Within this section, a glance 
at major historic events relating to public safety communications failures for first 
responders are considered, and how they lead to the creation of the National Public 
Safety Broadband Network. The 9/11 Commission final report of the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 
memorializes what can occur when such a circumstance is presented. The report 
emphasizes the difficulty experienced by first responders from various jurisdictions and 
agencies at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and Somerset County in coordinating 
response and recovery efforts. 113   Twelve years later, on September 16, 2013, the 
Washington Navy Yard mass shooting that left 12 dead and four wounded reminds us we 
are no closer to resolving this issue as first responder’s radio systems failed to provide 
adequate coverage and interoperability.114  Emergency responders were ultimately forced 
to use cell phones to coordinate their tactical response.  
The recommendations set forth by the 9/11 Commission supports the necessity of 
an Interoperable Public Safety Network—offering first responders from multiple 
jurisdictions and agencies the technological means to communicate with various 
emergency personnel at any given emergency incident nationwide. This however, proved 
to be an arduous endeavor, spanning in excess of ten years for final legislative approval. 
The passage of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112–96), 
adopted February 22, 2012, laid the framework for the development and financing of the 
113  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 397. 
114  Kevin Bogardus, “Radios Failed during Navy Yard Attack, Emergency Responders Say,” THE 
HILL, sec. HOME NEWS, Sep 19, 2013. 
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National Public Safety Broadband Network (NPSBN).115 It is the first step towards a 
monumental change for public safety. The following chapter will cover the legislation, 
technical requirements, standards, and potential issues that lay ahead in constructing this 
NPSBN. 
B. BACKGROUND  
The communications failure experienced during 9/11 became a lightening rod for 
intense discussions, arguing the necessity for first responders to be able to communicate 
among each other. This however, was not the impetus for creating an interoperable public 
safety network. Coincidentally, September 11, 1996, The Public Safety Wireless 
Advisory Committee (PSWAC) published a report 116  outlining recommendations to 
assist first responders in communicating during major incidents/disasters requiring multi-
agency response. The report states “the ability of officials from different Public Safety 
agencies to communicate with each other is limited…interoperability is key to success in 
day-to-day operations.”117   
The report further describes the unique wireless operational requirements, 
required for public safety. It states, the network should have: “1) dedicated capacity 
and/or priority access available at all times (and in sufficient amounts) to handle 
unexpected emergencies, 2) highly reliable (redundant) networks which are engineered 
and maintained to withstand natural disasters and other emergencies; 3) ubiquitous 
coverage within a given geographic area; 4) and unique terminal equipment (mobile or 
portable units) designed for quick response in emergency situations.”118  The public 
safety community understood the importance of creating national communications 
standards for first responders, however, until 9/11, and even after momentum would take 
years to build.  
115  Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 126 Stat., 15611-26 Stat., 256.  
116 Final Report of the Public Safety Wireless Advisory Committee to the Federal Communications 




                                                 
Since the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, there have been a multitude 
Congressional hearings, testimony and legislation regarding the 1) implementation 2) 
radio spectrum allocation, and 3) technical requirements for the NPSBN. During this 
period, several significant disasters have since transpired, reinforcing the urgency in 
developing said network. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
notes that D.H.S should work with the Office of Science and Technology Policy to 
develop a national emergency communications strategy that supports both operability and 
interoperability—referencing current laws, policies, and strategies relevant to 
communications.119   
C. DIGITAL TELEVISION TRANSITION AND PUBLIC SAFETY ACT 2005 
On September 15, 1997, the NTIA commented on communications needs for the 
federal, state, and local public safety communities before the FCC. The NTIA raised 
concerns over the need for additional radio spectrum to address the continued growth of 
existing voice systems, emerging technology utilizing high-speed imaging systems, and 
greater communications interoperability supporting government agencies throughout 
public safety. 120  The short-term solution proposed reallocating approximately 25 
megahertz of radio spectrum—reallocated from the television broadcast channels 60–
69.121  
The acquisition of this block of radio spectrum to public safety requires some 
elucidation. Channels 60–69 fall within the 700-megahertz (MHz) electromagnetic band 
of radio spectrum. There are 108 MHz of spectrum within this swathe, running from 698–
806 MHz.122 The 700 MHz Band offers significant propagation characteristics, primarily 
because of its location, which is immediately above the remaining TV broadcast 
channels. The most prevalent benefits are greater geographic coverage utilizing minimal 
119  United States. Executive Office of the President, United States, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
44. 
120  National Telecommunications & Information Administration, NTIA Comments, Reallocation of 
Television Channels 6066-9, 76688-06 MHz Band B. 
121 Ibid. 
122  Federal Communication Commission, 700 MHz Spectrum. 
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infrastructure, along with the capacity to broadcast through buildings and walls.123   The 
ability to leverage such robust coverage capacity while minimizing the need for 
additional infrastructure made this spectrum highly desirable for the public safety 
community—given their inherent mission. Figure 2 depicts the 700 MHz electromagnetic 
band of spectrum with the associated broadcast television channels.  
 
 
Figure 2.   700 MHz band plan for public safety services. 
In order to reacquire this spectrum for public safety, legislation was drafted, 
compelling the broadcast television industry to transition away from this band of 
channels within a fixed time period.124 The Digital Television Transition and Public 
Safety Act of 2005 provisioned “to terminate all licenses for full-power television 
stations in the analog television service, and to require the cessation of broadcasting by 
full-power stations in the analog television service, by February 18, 2009.”125   This was 
a milestone taken by Congress to ensure this valuable spectrum would be ready for public 
safety use.  
D. NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY BROADBAND NETWORK 
The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012,126 referred to as (The 
Act), represents the culmination of over a decade worth of testimony and debate directed 
at the necessity and feasibility of a National Public Safety Broadband Network. There are  
123  Federal Communication Commission, 700 MHz Spectrum.  
124  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Public Law 10911-71, (FEB. 8, 2006): 120 Stat., 4. 
125  Ibid., See (120 stat. 21). 
126  Public Law No.11299-6 (enacted February 22, 2012). 
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several significant components codified within this legislation that formalize the 
framework for oversight, standardization, development, and implementation of the 
NPSBN.  
First, the Act establishes an independent authority within the National 
Telecommunications & Information Administration (NTIA), known as the First 
Responder Network Authority (FirstNet). FirstNet, comprised of fifteen members, 
includes; the Secretary of Homeland Security, Attorney General of United States, 
Director of Office of Management and Budget, and twelve individuals appointed by the 
Secretary of Commerce. Together, they assume the crucial responsibility of establishing 
the NPSBN.127  The board has exclusive authority allowing it to control funding, request 
for proposals and ensuring nationwide standards for interoperability. Committee 
members are required to have expertise in the following fields: 1) Public safety 2) 
Technical fluency in broadband communications, 3) Commercial telecom network 
building, and 4) Telecom financing and funding.128  
The Act calls for FirstNet to ensure the NPSBN is safe, secure, and resilient, 
inclusive of protection from cyber attacks. Future equipment built to operate over the 
network must specifically be built with nonproprietary development standards, in order to 
create market competition. The Act recognizes developing this massive national network 
for the sole use of first responders is a daunting task that may not be practical to develop 
separately from the commercial wireless network of base stations, which already provide 
national coverage. The Act stipulates FirstNet to develop agreements with wireless 
providers in order to ensure the NPSBN has the capacity to “roam” onto commercial 
wireless base stations and gain priority access in times of emergency.129  In addition, it 
reallocated vital spectrum from 758–763 MHz and 788–793 MHz, known as “D Block” 
to the NPSBN.130 
127 Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, 126 stat. 15611-26 Stat., 256. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid., See SEC 6206 Roaming Agreements.  
130 Ibid., See SEC. 6101. Reallocation of D Block to Public Safety. 
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The NPSBN is an immense project that will require years to construct, operating 
over 4G-LTE, a standard cellular carriers have already begun migrating too. Considering 
the national coverage already provided by major mobile telecom providers, FirstNet 
should not discount leveraging some aspect of commercial BSs. In addition, as mobile 
telecom carriers are in the process of upgrading their cellular infrastructure to support 4G, 
it presents an opportunity to harden BSs with adequate back-up power, ensuring mission 
critical capacity to first responders during power outages. Finally, those reluctant to 
utilize the commercial cellular network for the NPSBN can reference the occurrences that 
transpired on September 16, 2013, where an active shooter killed 12 and wounded four at 
the Washington Navy Yard mass shooting. During the incident, first responder’s 
encountered communications black out when their portable radios, which receive signal 
from radio towers dedicated solely for fire and police, failed to provide adequate 
coverage.131  Cell phones were ultimately relied upon to coordinate response efforts, as 
they were the only devices able to receive adequate signal from commercial BSs. Thus, 
ensuring a negotiated agreement between commercial wireless carriers is essential for the 
NPSBN to become a reality within a reasonable time while keeping cost overrun at a 
minimum. 
131  Bogardus, Radios Failed During Navy Yard Attack, Emergency Responders Say. 
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V. INDIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF 
RENEWABLE/ALTERNATIVE ENERGY IN ITS MOBILE 
CELLULAR NETWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Within this section, an exploration of India’s economy is undertaken analyzing 
specific policy changes responsible for foreign investment, lowered foreign oil 
dependence, and the role of mobile cellular communication. Changes to economic policy 
enacted in the early 1990s may have shifted the country from fiscal turmoil to a path of 
potential global economic dominance second only to China. 132  There is also an 
examination of alternative/renewable energy’s potential role supporting BSs power 
requirements for back up and primary use. Chapter VI then goes on to analyze the 
telecommunications policy outlined in India’s NTP-2012 to determine the potential 
applications for the U.S. commercial cellular network. The policy proposes how the 
country’s vast cellular network will significantly lower its consumption of diesel fuel 
through the use of renewable energy—supporting the global consensus to lower carbon 
emissions.  
B. BACKGROUND 
India, the world’s largest democracy with the second largest population at 
1,220,800,359 estimated as of July 2013,133 gained independence Aug 15, 1947 through 
nonviolent efforts, succeeding nearly 200 years of British colonial rule. The majority of 
the population, 68 percent, lives in predominantly rural areas lacking vital infrastructure 
such as power, utilities, and education. Its’ population offers a massive workforce both 
technical and labor rich. The nation has undergone significant economic and political 
transformation since 1991, fueling current and future economic prosperity. Mobile 
cellular communications play an integral part in this.  
132  O’Neill, A 10-Step Program for India’s Economy. 
133 “The WORLD FACTBOOK.”  
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In the early 1990s, India’s economy faced growing inflation, unemployment, 
poverty and dramatic foreign exchange reserve. 134   India’s economy was severely 
impacted by the Gulf War along with the fall of the Soviet Union. The Soviets’ were a 
major trading partner and their predominant supplier of low-cost crude oil. As a result of 
the Soviet Union’s collapse, India was forced to purchase oil in the open market.135  This 
created an economic hardship, as the country relies heavily on imported crude. As of 
2009, that figure was estimated at 2.768 million bbl/day with domestic production at 
897,300 bbl/day.136 A by product of the nation’s crude oil dependence creates 1.696 
billion metric tons of carbon dioxide as of 2011 estimations.137  
In 1990, the country emerged from certain financial collapse as a result of policy 
changes from the Economic Reforms of 1991. The Economic Reforms of 1991 enacted 
changes to macro economic policies “lowering tariff levels, exchange rate policy, 
liberalized licensing policy and also relaxed India’s foreign direct investment (FDI) 
policy.”138 Over the past two decades, these changes have positively stimulated India’s 
economy as seen in the increase of foreign investment. India’s final economic stimulus 
can be attributed to the growing expertise and demand of information technology. The 
country has become the epicenter for many multinational companies’ research and 
development due to the lower cost and the available local talent.139  
India is projected to be the second largest economy globally by 2050, surpassing 
the U.S. as predicted by Jim O’Neill a former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset 
Management who is a Bloomberg View columnist.140 However, the road to prosperity is 
not paved in certainty. In order to arrive at its economic potential, India will need to make 
additional reforms across many sectors. Nevertheless, even with minimal growth, India is 
134  Dushyant Gosai, History of Economic Growth in India. 
135  Ibid. 
136 “The WORLD FACTBOOK.”  
137  Ibid. 
138  Dushyant Gosai, History of Economic Growth in India. 
139  Ibid. 
140  O’Neill, A 10-Step Program for India’s Economy. 
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poised, as an economic driving force the world cannot ignore. O’Neill further highlights 
which specific sectors require further changes in A 10-Step Program for India’s 
Economy;  
1. Improve its governance through effective government  
2. Primary and secondary education needs addressing, as many young people 
get little to no education 
3. Improve colleges and universities. Developing institutions for excellence  
4. Adopt an inflation target 
5. Medium to long-term fiscal-policy framework, setting deficit of less than 
3 percent of Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and debt of less than 60 
percent 
6. Increase trade with its neighbors. Exports to China predicted to be $1 
trillion by 2050. However, exports to Bangladesh and Pakistan is minimal    
7. Liberalize financial markets, increasing domestic and foreign capital 
8. Innovate farming  
9. Build more infrastructure  
10. Protect the environment, through the use of energy and resource 
efficiency. Expand the private sector’s investment in sustainable 
technologies  
C. RENEWABLE ENERGY, HYBRID SOLAR-WIND BASE STATION 
India has seen tremendous growth in cellular utilization becoming the second 
largest mobile phone market globally.141  Supporting this massive cellular network are 
400,000 base stations distributed throughout the country. The majority of these BSs 
receive power primarily from commercial electrical grid service. Grid power, however, is 
highly unreliable in certain rural locations resulting in regular power outages lasting at 
times in excess of fourteen hours per day, forcing service providers to equip BSs with 
diesel generators.142 BSs servicing remote locations operate off diesel generators year 
141  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
142  Naikodi, Solar-Wind Hybrid Power for Rural Indian Cell Sites, 69–72. 
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round as extending the power grid to these locations are cost prohibitive. As the price of 
diesel, regular maintenance, fuel delivery, and pollution from generators cause cell sites 
to become nonprofitable, India’s government, who subsidizes diesel fuel, set aggressive 
standards to lower their fossil fuel dependence.143  The Indian government has mandated 
that by 2015, 50 percent of its rural cell sites be converted to operate on renewable 
energy. 144  An article produced by Dr. Allabaksh Naikodi proposes how the use of 
renewable energy can reduce the consumption of diesel and potentially allow BSs 
complete independence from grid power.  
Dr. Allabaksh Naikodi conducted a study published 2010 in the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) on the use of alternative energy to provide 
sustainable power to base stations in remote locations of India.145  The study provided 
valuable insight regarding lowering the overall consumption of diesel fuel by using 
abundant renewable solar-wind energy.  
The study first analyzed electronic components required to operate a BS along 
with the related power consumption. In doing so, the average power utilization was 
derived, which ranged from 3.04–6.32 kilowatt (kW), respectively. Air conditioning was 
identified as the main power consumer—requiring 60 percent of overall power for in-
door sites. Second, alternative solar and wind energy were independently tested to 
determine the optimal combination to produce the required electrical load needed to 
power a BS. Last, the study analyzed an average GSM type BS deployed in a rural 
location with a 2.8 kW peak power requirement for a period of five months. Dr. Naikodi 
then retrofitted the BS with renewable energy and monitored its performance for an 
additional five months. Eighteen photovoltaic solar panels were installed producing 
4.05kW with wind turbine producing 3kW. The energy produced from the hybrid solar- 
wind installation was subsequently stored in a battery bank, accessible to a load controller 
that efficiently cycled between renewable energy, a diesel generator, and grid power to 
keep the BS operating.  
143  Naikodi, Solar-Wind Hybrid Power for Rural Indian Cell Sites, 69–72.  
144  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
145  Naikodi, Solar-Wind Hybrid Power for Rural Indian Cell Sites, 69–72. 
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The study effectively proved how efficient and cost effective renewable energy 
can be for powering base stations in remote locations and the implication for broader 
usage. To illustrate the savings produced utilizing renewables, the study calculated the 
annual cost of powering a base station with a diesel generator. There are approximately 
110,000 rural cell sites—each site consumes on average 1000 liters or 264 gallons of 
diesel per month. The cost to power a single BS per year equates to $12,257, with the 
price of diesel at $3.869 per gallon in the U.S. That figure translates to $1.3 billion per 
year when the 110,000 rural sites are summed.146 The results of installing solar-wind 
renewable energy produced a 90 percent reduction in diesel usage. The monetary and 
environment factor of using less diesel fuel is astonishing. The following explanation of 
fuel cells illustrates how incorporating such technology can further lower the dependency 
of diesel generators. 
D. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY, FUEL CELLS  
Fuel cells are an environmentally friendly technology that has seen expansive 
application in the public and private sector, capable of powering small stationary 
components to entire buildings without the production of harmful green house gases.147  
They are capable of remote monitoring and operation allowing them great flexibility in 
reducing power consumption on the grid by switching a large distribution of them on at 
peak demand times. There are several types of fuel cells, however, the most common 
utilized for small to medium standby power is proton exchange membrane (PEM).148  
Fuel cells combine a fuel source such as (hydrogen, natural gas, methane, methanol) with 
oxygen to produce electricity through a chemical process.149  The process occurs absent 
any moving parts or combustion.150 Water and heat are the only effluents expelled from 
146 Price reflected from U.S. Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/gasdiesel/.   
147 “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters.”  
148  Blanchard, “Smart Energy Solutions using Fuel Cells,” 2011, 2. 
149 Ibid. 
150 See fuelcells2000 for further explanation, 
http://www.fuelcells.org/base.cgim?template=types_of_fuel_cells. 
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the process. 151   They are structurally similar to a battery utilizing and electrolyte. 
However, they do not store electricity nor run down or require recharging.152 
Recognizing the inherent dependency and vulnerability of grid power, fuel cells 
become a viable component in providing uninterrupted operational capacity for telecom 
providers. For instance in 2008, Sprint Nextel began a pilot program sponsored by the 
Department of Energy through its American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) to 
promote alternative energy; installing fuel cells for back-up power in a portion of its 
BSs.153 The company has since advocated the complete replacement of all its existing 
back-up power equipment at telecommunications sites with fuel cells.154 Several other 
wireless service providers have also pursued installing fuel cells to BSs. MetroPCS being 
one of the largest deploying 2,000 in California, and 350 in South Florida.155  
Recent natural disasters have tested the resilience of fuel cells. Superstorm Sandy 
(2012) pounded the Bahamas, leaving several islands without power. On the islands of 
New Providence, Abaco, and Grand Bahama, fuel cells kept the cellular network 
functioning for seven days, allowing critical communications.156 The cost benefit of 
utilizing fuel cells is starting to rival diesel generators, which are still the primary 
component to provide backup power. Fuel cell manufacture Ballard Power Systems 
claims their ElectraGen-H2 fuel cell provides greater efficiencies than conventional 
diesel generators with a return on investment projected over three years when tax credits 
and maintenance savings are factored in.157 Within the mobile telecom industry, fuel 
cells have shown value in two major areas, 1) UPS/backup capacity during grid failure, 2) 
Power to remote locations where grid power has not or will not be delivered. With the 
152   Maya Smart, “Hydrogen Fuel Cells Backup Infrastructure Cleanly and Quietly,” Department of 
Energy, http://energy.gov/articles/hydrogen-fuel-cells-backup-infrastructure-cleanly-and-quietly. 
152 “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters, 2. 
153  Kevin Fitchard, THE GREENING OF XOHM, 3844–0. 
154 “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters.”  
155 Ibid. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid., 5. 
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second option, a hybrid combination of photovoltaic (PV) solar panels, with battery 
banks offers optimal reliability and autonomy from grid power.158 
India has taken the lead globally in leveraging renewable and alternative energy to 
power their cellular network. The aforementioned local research and development 
conducted by Dr. Naikodi, along with industry reports, support a national effort to lower 
fossil fuel dependence. Telecom service providers in India have accepted this 
environmentally supportive policy as illustrated in their overall cellular network 
transformation, converting one city at a time. The aggressive time frame and commitment 
should also be noted as the “Green City” initiative was conceptualized in early 2011.159 
The world’s largest telecom tower company, Indus Towers Limited, through its national 
Carbon Abatement Program has converted cell towers in over six cities in India to utilize 
alternative energy. Mumbai has been rebranded as a “Green City,” supporting the 
company’s commitment to the environment.160  The company’s CEO B. S. Shantharaju 
elaborates on the company’s vision; “We will take this campaign to as many cities as 








158 Pereira-Bahia and Paulmier, “Operational Feed-Back on Fuel Cell Solutions for Telecom Needs,” 
2007. 
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VI. INDIA’S MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATION STRATEGY:  
A MODEL FOR U.S. CONSIDERATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
India’s NTP strategy is a culmination of the nation’s commitment to achieving 
economic superiority through technological advancements in mobile cellular 
infrastructure. There is also a parallel effort to provide socio-economic parity to its under 
serviced majority population with equal emphasis on environmental consciousness. The 
Indian government recognizes the role mobile commerce plays in the nation’s future 
economic prosperity. The strategic direction taken within this policy demonstrates how 
government sponsored initiatives supported by private industry can achieve great things 
for the populous. There are four main strategies targeted within the NTP that have direct 
implications for U.S. application: 1) Expanding its commercial mobile wireless network 
to rural underdeveloped regions with inadequate grid power, 2) Creating a robust resilient 
mobile wireless network capable of withstanding disasters both natural and manmade, 3) 
Incentives for corporate adoption, and 4) Investing in renewable/alternative energy to 
power base stations in order to lower fossil fuel dependency and harmful carbon 
emissions.  
B. BACKGROUND 
There are noteworthy perspectives, guiding India to purse such an ambitious 
policy for their commercial mobile network. First, they recognized the value and 
trajectory of mobility and the associated m-commerce that can be realized. Mobile phone 
calls attributed for 911 million out of the 943 million total calls respectively at the end of 
February 2012. In order to tap into this vast market with infinite potential, the country 
requires reliable cellular phone service. However, a major impediment in achieving this 
goal is overcoming an unreliable and underdeveloped power grid.  
India’s commercial power grid is highly unstable providing power for mere hours 
in certain locations. The grid is also concentrated in Metropolitan cities and does not 
extend to the majority of rural areas, where the largest portion of the population lives. 
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This becomes a core perspective in the NTP, which proposes to “transform the socio-
economic scenario through accelerated equitable and inclusive economic growth by 
laying special emphasis on providing affordable and quality telecommunications services 
to rural remote areas.”162  These rural areas offer a tremendous under-penetrated market, 
which the government projects will be an exponential driving force once exposed to 
mobile resources. The strategy takes into consideration the enormous cost associated with 
physically extending the power grid to distant remote areas and notes these communities 
may be better served by erecting self-sustainable BSs. BSs in the rural areas lacking grid 
power would be constructed to use renewable/alternative energy as the primary power 
source.  
Within the core strategy of the NTP is mitigating the harmful practice of utilizing 
diesel generators to power BSs during grid failure. The obvious drawbacks of generators 
are; regular maintenance, consistent fuel delivery, carbon emissions, and consuming large 
quantities of diesel fuel. As noted earlier within this paper, India does not produce the 
majority of its fossil fuel and relies heavily on imports. This dependency is a primary 
factor in developing self-sustainable BSs, as fuel costs are projected to continue rising 
globally. 163   With the fall of the Soviet Union, India no longer has the political 
relationship to rely on cheap imports.      
In order to stimulate investment and commitment towards the enormous changes 
perceived in this strategy, the Indian government framed the policy to be conducive 
towards corporate adoption. It outlines the need for financial and fiscal incentives to draw 
local manufacturing of telecom products along with encouraging research and 
development. 164   The NTP further proposed the country invest in renewable and 
alternative energy to decouple its fossil fuel dependency. There is a concerted strategic 
effort to achieve this. It proposes the “adoption of green policy in telecom and incentivize 
use of renewable energy sources for sustainability.”  This is a crucial factor in moving 
162 India’s National Telecom Policy - 2012. 
163 Tammy Parker, “Vendors and Operators Target a Greener LTE Future,” 
http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/vendors-and-operators-target-greener-lte-future/20130–12–3. 
164  India’s National Telecom Policy - 2012, 7. 
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towards an eco-friendly self-sustainable mobile network by providing economic 
incentives. The second portion of this strategy targets the use of energy efficient 
equipment. The overall goal is to lower the energy consumption to levels where 
renewable energy is better suited to power the entire system. India has set an aggressive 
goal of converting 50 percent of its rural base stations to operate on renewables by 
2015.165 This is no simple task considering the nation has approximately 400,000 BSs. 
Phase two of this strategy target 75 percent of rural, and 33 percent of urban BSs by 2020 
to utilize renewables.  
C. DISCUSSION 
The strategic direction taken by the Indian government to modernize its mobile 
cellular network was born from necessity. However, it developed into a nationwide 
narrative with enormous potential for supporting the country’s economic prosperity. The 
core focus envisions how to create a cellular network with the capacity for resilience, 
powered by renewable/alternative energy, able to provide services to the majority-
underserviced population. In order to create a robust cellular network, the NTP targets the 
deficiencies of its current infrastructure and identifies potential solutions to rectify. For 
instance, how renewables can offset the irregular service provided by the power grid. As 
such, the country recognizes the interdependence of the private sector to stimulate some 
of these changes proactively, along with the limitations of its power grid to provide 
reliable service. Thus, lending to incentives for corporate adoption. The policy speculates 
how these changes would offer greater services to its majority population, which in turn 
would contribute to the economic vitality of the country via an increase in mobile 
commerce generated through a modern cellular network.  
D. U.S. IMPLICATIONS 
Given the recent litany of natural disasters, all of which exposing various 
vulnerabilities within the U.S. commercial mobile network, India’s NTP-2012 provides a 
potential framework to achieve a resilient environmentally sustainable mobile network. 
165  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
 57 
                                                 
However, U.S. telecom service providers would have a critical role in the success of 
theses policy changes and represent a major hurdle to overcome. In order to move 
forward with many of these changes, a cost-benefit model would need to be constructed 
to demonstrate actual return on investment from upgrading the commercial cellular 
network. Some carriers may offer resistance, simply because the U.S. has a power grid 
that is highly reliable, with the loss of revenue from inoperable BSs minimized due to 
infrequency. Mobile carries have also shown a reluctance to install back-up power to 
BSs, as seen in the repeal of legislation post-Hurricane Katrina, which mandated 8 hours 
of continued service during power outages.166 In addition, renewable/alternative energy 
requires substantial initial investment.  
These issues are relevant and require a collaborative effort between the 
government and private industry. However, this should not detract from the key strategic 
goals presented within the NTP, which can be implemented now with the appropriate 
support. Timing is opportune as FirstNet undertakes a national review of the U.S. 
commercial mobile cellular network to determine the implications for supporting the 
NPSBN. The driving force behind India’s strategic telecom policy assumed the negative 
implications of supporting national economic and social growth with a substandard 
electrical grid. Consequently, the principal strategic components limit that exposure by 
decoupling their mobile telecom network from the electric grid through the use of 
renewable energy with the realization that harmful carbon emissions would also decrease.  
Another significant assumption is reducing India’s overall consumption of 
imported crude oil. U.S. telecom service providers have not considered this an issue 
potentially because of America’s reliable power grid. Thus, lowering the need for mass 
distribution and use of diesel generators throughout the network for everyday use. India 
crafted the NTP based on a vision to provide mobile wireless access across the country, 
which is estimated to provide substantial economic stimulus via m-commerce, while 
limiting the exposure of a faulty power grid. Applying this strategy to the U.S. cellular  
 
166 “When the Grid Fails: Fuel Cells Power Critical Infrastructure in Disasters.”  
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network is challenging but should not discount the fact that the proposal provides vast 
improvements in resilience to a network that has systematically failed during power 
outages and natural disasters.  
FirstNet is positioned to facilitate some of these changes with the help of the FCC 
and the U.S Department of Energy. The U.S. cellular network’s lack of resilience creates 
a challenge and opportunity for FirstNet. FirstNet is sanctioned to create a robust resilient 
NPSBN that will operate on 4G-LTE technologies capable of operating during critical 
events and disasters. There are three ways for FirstNet to achieve this: 1) Construct an 
entirely independent and new cellular network, 2) Leverage the current commercial 
cellular network, or 3) Create a hybrid network, utilizing commercial and newly 
constructed BSs to supplement areas with poor commercial coverage.  
The major telecom service providers have already adopted the primary 
technological driver the NPSBN will operate over 4G-LTE, as the next generation 
technology networks will migrate too. This provides an enormous opportunity as they 
engage in converting old equipment in BSs to new 4G-LTE energy efficient technologies 
that consume significantly less power. Telecoms can incorporate renewable/alternative 
energy during this upgrade. If an agreed upon portion of the U.S. cellular network can be 
retrofitted with renewable and alternative energy capable of providing coverage during 
power outages suitable to FirstNet’s standard for reliability, why would they need to 
construct an independent network?  The cost implications and ease of deploying the 
NPSBN would save years and billions, if the primary U.S. commercial cellular network 
could be hardened, and renewable energy can provide that resilience.  
This issue needs to be brought to the forefront of the discussion as the NPSBN 
moves well beyond the conceptual stage and into the early stages of planning its build 
out. Strategically it should follow: 1) Standardized construction codes to identify where 
BSs can be built and to relocate those that are in high risk areas, 2) Minimum energy 
efficiency guidelines for required components, 3) Renewable and alternative energy 




standards eliminating the use of diesel generators. As FirstNet develops various requests 
for information/proposals, these underlying requirements should be clearly outlined as a 
component of any proposal.  
Finally, the technological shift to high-speed digital networks, although logically 
diversified, relies on the same core infrastructure—fiber optic cable. The complexity of 
convergent telecom networks capable of transmitting rich multi-media, data, and voice all 
over a single medium at the speed of light, creates a potential risk through optimization. 
As we increase capacity and marvel at such progress, we discount self-organization that 
is an inherent consequence. The national campaign pursued by telecom providers to 
decommission conventional copper telephone service eliminates a vital mode of 
communications that has immense value during power outages, as many have come to 
rely on. In order to counter this self-organization, these networks require decoupling, 
hence, providing redundancies via different mediums, potentially provided by 





VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The government has begun to realize the need to change how critical 
infrastructure is designed and functions in the U.S. The NYS 2100 Commission, a 
document critiquing the impact of Superstorm Sandy, identifies the critical dependency a 
centralized power grid has and determined transitioning to micro grids would provide 
greater resilience by limiting the degree of failure that can cascade throughout an entire 
network. In addition, renewable/alternative energy plays an integral part in providing 
continuity of services during power outages. The document proposed the use of 
incentives to stimulate investment in renewables, to decouple grid power dependency, 
while supporting the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative of lowering carbon emissions. 
Such proposals foster the appropriate atmosphere to advocate hardening BSs with 
renewable/alternative energy.  
There has been a parallel effort to increase the use of alternative energy taken on 
by the U.S. Department of Energy. The Department of Energy has provided subsidies for 
companies investing in alternative fuel cell technology in order to increase usage. Sprint 
Nextel, was among one of the first participants of this program testing fuel cells in their 
WiMAX network.167  The company, in a nascent stage in 2008, explored the viability of 
creating a “green network,” illustrating how American telecom service providers are not 
adverse to economically and environmentally sustainable mobile networks. However, 
such efforts have not risen to a level of urgency, for a myriad of reasons. Some of which 
can be attributed to the difficulty in changing local zoning ordinances along with 
educating the public on the use of alternative energy, which were still in early product 
design stages in 2008. The Environmental Protection Agency can play a pivotal 
supporting role with an information campaign about the benefit and safety of alternative 
energy.168   
167  Fitchard, The Greening of XOHM, 38–40. 
168 Ibid. 
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In order to achieve a resilient green commercial cellular network, there are key 
incremental steps that need to be addressed; 1) Elevating minimum standards of 
operational capacity (e.g., how long must BSs operate after power failure), 2) 
Codification of law for BSs to provide continuous service during power outages using 
renewable/alternative energy, 3) Ordinance changes to account for standard construction 
practices (e.g., erecting BSs outside of flood zones), and 4) Finally, incorporating energy 
efficient technology that lowers overall power consumption for BSs. The F.C.C would 
need to propose minimum extended operational capacity for BSs when power failure 
occurs. From a disaster management perspective, maximum operational time would be 
preferred, however, there should not be a financial burden to arrive at this end state. 
Initial requirements should allow BSs to function for five days once grid power fails. 
That figure should increase over the next three years to complete self-sustainable BSs no 
longer requiring a connection to the power grid.  
BSs should not immediately fail when grid power is lost. There should be 
controlled failure that occurs incrementally, where a self-sustainable back-up power 
design allows continuous operations throughout various stages in a disaster when power 
is lost. The research produced by Dr. Allabaksh Naikodi offers a suitable model for U.S. 
deployment. Within Naikodi’s logical flow, solar photovoltaic panels combined with 
wind turbines create the first layer of power. Battery banks receive charge from solar 
panels and wind turbines, which are subsequently switched on when primary solar-wind 
power is unavailable. A deviation from his model incorporates fuel cells as the next layer 
of redundancy—activating when battery banks run low from potential environmental 
factors prohibiting full charging capacity of solar wind. Within Naikodi’s model, this 
layer would have utilized a diesel generator, although minimally as his test results 
demonstrated. The fuel cell supplemental is to achieve a completely carbon emission free 
BS. 
Prior to implementing alternative/renewable energy in the mobile telecom sector, 
the federal government needs to first, direct the FCC to mandate standardized 
construction practices for the locations of BSs. They should be constructed outside of 
flood prone areas to mitigate the impact from storm surges. Second, telecom service 
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providers upgrading their cellular network to support 4G-LTE can incorporate alternative 
and renewable energy as backup/primary power for BSs during this lengthy transition. 
Third, a moratorium on the use of grid power for future constructed BSs and 
decommissioning copper landlines should be enacted. Last, a predetermined time period 
(to be developed by the FCC) allowing cellular carriers to convert 50 percent of their BSs 
to alternative/renewables, with incentives for greater conversion. This is an ambitious 
goal considering the U.S. has less than one percent of its BSs equipped with back-up 
power provided by renewable/alternative energy, but yet attainable.169 
A. GREEN BASE STATION CONVERSION-LOCAL PILOT 
Conceptually applying a national strategy to develop resilient green BSs to an 
individual city provides a framework, which can be replicated throughout the country. 
The following pilot demonstrates the steps needed to harden BSs for a local city/county. 
The first step requires accounting for all BSs within a specific city. This should already 
be available and provided by the local telecom provider. Next, a map of the city with an 
overlay of flood zones should be utilized for plotting BS locations. This will determine 
priority order in either retrofitting or relocating BSs. Generally, costal areas receive the 
most damage from these storms and should be the first addressed. Second, an assessment 
of BSs constructed in flood zones—noting, if they were affected by prior storms or are at 
risk for future damage. Third, the survey should continue with the assistance of the local 
telecom provider in determining what form of back-up power is installed, if any, and to 
which specific towers. Derecho has shown that service providers are not proactively 
documenting this.170  
Once the initial assessment is completed, a project plan can then be formalized. 
There are two ways to consider moving forward. First, with legislative approval requiring 
BSs to operate during power outages and incorporating renewable and alternative energy.  
 
169  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
170  A Report of The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, Impact of the June 2012 Derecho 
on Communications Network and Services. Report and Recommendations. 
 63 
                                                 
Second, without legislative approval but carried out under voluntary compliance from 
telecom service providers. The following requirements will need to be gathered prior to 
initiating construction. 
1. Determine which BSs would be retrofitted with renewable/alternative 
energy.  
2. Determine which BSs require relocation due to improper site selection 
(e.g., flood zones). 
3. Determine appropriate suppliers of equipment and develop timetable to 
insure production and delivery of supplies do not impact onsite work.  
After completing above assessment, the time line for the necessary work can then 
be defined. The process should be staged accordingly with appropriate milestones to 
track progress. The city should be broken down into sectors with priority given to 
coastal/flood prone areas. These areas would be the first retrofitted, as they are most at 
risk.  
At this point, telecom service providers are given the directive to complete 
retrofitting and relocating BSs to areas protected from flood or surge damage. The 
process should mandate completing high priority areas within two years. After which, a 
minimum of fifty percent systematic conversion of the remaining sectors to 
renewable/alternative energy should follow over the next five years. The researcher 
proposed this time frame taking into consideration that India will reach this milestone 
with a cellular network greater in size at 400,000—100,000 more BSs than the U.S.171 
Tweed notes that the Indian government has mandated 50 percent of rural BSs to be 
powered by renewables by 2015.172  To facilitate early compliance, incentives become 
important and should be given to telecoms to encourage further conversion. Arriving at 
this level of resilience within five years is a reasonable time line considering less than 
one percent of BSs in the U.S. is powered by renewables.173  
171 The U.S. cellular network is comprised of approximately 300,000 BSs,  “Wireless Quick Facts.” 
Comparison taken from December 2007 to December 2012. 
172  Tweed, Why Cellular Towers in Developing Nations are Making the Move to Solar Power. 
173 Ibid. 
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B. CONCLUSION 
In summary, it is integral to answer the core purpose of this research. Are there 
common reasons cellular base stations fail? An analysis of Hurricane Katrina, Superstorm 
Sandy, and Derecho, depicts common causes for failure. Primarily, BSs failure can be 
attributed to the loss of grid power. Once the power grid fails, BSs either operate on 
battery power for a few hours or diesel generators, if so equipped. For those units 
equipped with diesel generators, fuel starvation or mechanical failure was the main 
culprit for failure. Additionally, the location of cell sites constructed in flood zones 
experienced a greater degree of physical damage from storm surge as compared to high 
wind. The issues discovered do not pose a severe impediment for overall remediation. 
Enacting standard construction regulations would alleviate damage to BSs constructed in 
flood zones ensuring they are located out of harms way. The researcher could not locate 
any such ordinances regulating where BS could or could not be constructed. Further, 
failures that occurred from a loss of grid power can be supplanted by incorporating 
resilient back-up power provide by solar-wind, and fuel cells that are not impacted in the 
event of a fuel shortage. Additionally, the investment into micro grids would also 
decrease the cascading effect from centralized grid failure.  
The researcher then analyzed if the strategic direction taken by the Indian 
government to increase resilience within the country’s mobile cellular network utilizing 
renewable energy were considered a viable policy option for the United States to pursue? 
The main directives within the NTP offer practical application for the U.S. government to 
consider. The core focus bears direct relation with transitioning away from cost 
prohibitive and environmentally impactful fossil fuel dependent cellular network. The 
document envisions reaching its rural parts of the country by constructing BSs powered 
with renewable/alternative energy to provide essential services and opportunities to these 
isolated communities. Through the NTP, the government saw tremendous potential in 
using cellular technology to reach the vast majority population, 68 percent who live in 
these distant rural areas. The economic prospects of tapping into an under utilized core 
demographic offers significant financial benefit derived from the ever increasing role of 
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mobile commerce. The framework of the NTP can be implemented in the U.S. from an 
overall policy perspective under the direction of the FCC  
The research also analyzed if implementing such a policy would allow BSs to 
provide continuous service during power failures. The implication of using the NTP 
strategy would allow BSs to provide continuous service during power failures in addition 
to supporting the RGGI. In order to provide continuous service during power failures, 
BSs need a supplemental power source provided by some form of back-up power. 
Installing renewable/alternative energy would provide BSs with the ability to continue 
functioning during power outages. Also, the failure rate and maintenance cycle for 
currently used generators would be eliminated, if renewables were installed. Second, the 
critical dependency of logistically coordinating fuel to these sites would also be removed. 
Retrofitting BSs with renewable energy, as tested by Dr. Allabaksh Naikodi, lowered 
dependency on diesel to marginal levels. Incorporating fuel cells in place of generators 
removed the diesel dependency and eliminated any carbon emissions.  
In addition, can the use of alternative and renewable energy provide BSs with the 
capacity to be self-sustainable, no longer reliant on grid power?  The researcher 
determined using alternative and renewable energy provided BSs with the capacity to be 
self-sustainable, no longer reliant on grid power. The main premise within the NTP is to 
increase resilience of India’s mobile cellular network, specifically to remote areas by 
erecting self-sustainable BSs. The document further expands on designing BSs to use 
econ-friendly equipment with lower power consumption allowing renewable/alternative 
energy the ability to be an optimal solution to power BSs without the need for grid 
power. This model can be implemented in the U.S. to systematically lower the overall 
power consumption for these cellular networks—freeing energy to be redistributed 
throughout the power grid.  
Finally, how will these changes affect the construction of the NPSBN? As the 
NPSBN transition from concept to construction, the infrastructure essential to make this 
network a viable option—the commercial cellular network—fails to provide the public 
and first responders a reliable source of communicating during power outages. The 
changes proposed within the NTP would positively support the NPSBN. The main focus 
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of the NTP of leveraging technology to provide BSs with the independence to operate 
without grid power is exactly what is needed to harden the U.S. cellular network to 
provide mission critical capacity to first responders. Linda K. Moore, Public Safety 
Communications and Spectrum, Resources: Policy Issues for Congress comments on the 
potential deficiencies in the U.S. commercial cellular network; “Infrastructure for vital 
services such as emergency communications requires additional measures to ensure 
operability in difficult environments such as extreme weather and power failures.” 
Additionally, Moore reiterates that cellular BSs need to be “strengthened against natural 
hazards and furnished with back-up power supplies that can outlast extended power 
outages.”174 The NPSBN will operate over, 4G-LTE cellular technologies; the standard 
service providers throughout the U.S. are currently migrating too. The dilemma for 
FirstNet to consider is should they construct an entirely separate network or leverage 
some or the entire commercial wireless network. In order to deploy the NPSBN within a 
reasonable timeframe with significantly lowered cost, FirstNet needs to leverage the 
commercial cellular network. New BSs should only be constructed to supplement 
coverage, not to replace it, keeping the cost of infrastructure down.175  If this strategy is 
considered, it becomes essential that the suggestions made within this thesis for creating 
resilient BSs be the minimum standard incorporated by service providers. Without 
incorporating these changes, the cellular network will not be able to support first 
responders in mission critical situations, when power is lost.  
Finally, those reluctant to utilize the commercial cellular network for the NPSBN 
can reference the occurrences that transpired on September 16, 2013, where an active 
shooter killed 12 and wounded four at the Washington Navy Yard mass shooting. During 
the incident, first responder’s encountered communication difficulties when their portable 
radios, which receive signal from radio towers dedicated solely for fire and police failed 
to provide adequate coverage.176 As the chaos unfolded, cell phones were ultimately 
174  Moore, Public Safety Communications and Spectrum Resources: Policy Issues for Congress. 
175 James Arden Barnett Jr., “Subcommittee on Communications and Technology Committee on 
Energy and Commerce US House of Representatives Hearing on “Oversight of FirstNet and Emergency 
Communications” March 14, 2013.” 
176  Bogardus, Radios Failed during Navy Yard Attack, Emergency Responders Say. 
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relied on to coordinate the response and recovery efforts when police and fire radios 
became unreliable. This shows the essential role the commercial cellular network plays in 
coverage and capacity—providing this critical level of communication for incident 
management. The incident demonstrated how current mobile cellular infrastructure 
provided vital communications for first responders, while highlighting two significant 
issues debated since the 9/11 Commission recommendations. First, the incident illustrates 
how there is still a major problem with first responders from various agencies and 
jurisdictions communicating among each other at an emergency incident. Second, the 
limitations of radio systems dedicated for police and fire could not provide adequate 
coverage, leading to communications black out as noted by the incident commander who 
was unable to communicate from his position inside the building to fire units outside of 
the building.177    
There are various examples referenced within this research that provide 
alternatives to create a resilient mobile cellular network capable of functioning 
independent of grid power. They are not without cost or challenge; however, they do 
offer an encouraging opportunity for environmental security, operational functionality, 
and sustainable energy. Utilizing a hybrid combination of fuel cells with solar-wind 
power is a step in the right direction, with the terminal objective of eliminating reliance 
on diesel generators.  
Base stations’ operating solely on renewable energy is an achievable goal as the 
proliferation of energy efficient components and technologies are leveraged in their 
design. Creating these various layers of autonomy from grid power offers greater 
resilience for a public that fails to realize the ramifications of an all-cellular phone 
network—while ensuring the future survivability of a soon to be constructed NPSBN. 
These options should be reviewed by the N.T.I.A, FCC, FirstNet, and then presented to 
wireless industry leaders as a means to introduce dialogue to strengthen current wireless 
infrastructure. It should also provide context to reconsider decommissioning vital copper 
landlines. The practices and strategy taken by phone carriers in the U.S. addresses 
177 Bogardus, Radios Failed during Navy Yard Attack, Emergency Responders Say. 
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primarily profit, but at the expense of public safety. Standing up a high-speed wireless 
network is a marvel that will offer great value and support an insatiable global appetite 
for mobile commerce. However, it should not be done without thoroughly appreciating 
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